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Abstract
An indivisible object may be sold to one of n agents who know their valuations
of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but
her knowledge of the valuations’ distribution is scarce: she knows only the means
(which may be different) and an upper bound for valuations. Valuations may be
correlated.
Using a constructive approach based on duality, we prove that a mechanism
that maximizes the worst-case expected revenue among all deterministic dominant-
strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational mechanisms takes the
following form: (1) the bidders submit bids bi; (2) for each bidder, a linear score
si = βibi − αi is calculated where αi, βi are fixed parameters; (3) the object is
awarded to the agent with the highest score, provided it’s nonnegative; (4) the
winning bidder pays the minimal amount he would need to bid to still win in the
auction. The set of optimal mechanisms includes other mechanisms but all those
have to be close to the optimal linear score auction in a certain sense. When means
are high, all optimal mechanisms share the linearity property. Second-price auction
without a reserve is an optimal mechanism when the number of symmetric bidders
is sufficiently high.
Keywords: Robust Mechanism Design, Worst-case objective, Auctions, Moments prob-
lems, Duality
This paper has benefited from comments from (in random order) Ilya Segal, Alex Bloedel,
Bob Wilson, Dmitry Arkhangelsky, Dan Iancu, Gabriel Carroll, Andy Skrzypacz and Pavel
Krivenko.
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1 Introduction
One of the most basic problems in mechanism design is allocation of an item among
n buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. The classical solution due to Myerson (1981)
has been obtained under the assumption of expected revenue maximization, where the
expectation is taken with respect to a fixed product distribution of bidders’ values. This
distribution is assumed either to (1) be objectively known by the seller or (2) represent
her subjective beliefs.
While this assumption has led to important insights and does constitute a reasonable
approximation to reality in certain cases, it may be less plausible in other situations. For
example, a new good may be for sale, or the seller might not be a subjective expected
utility maximizer. Even if the good is not new, there may exist purely statistical problems
with non-parametric estimation of density functions, especially multiple-dimensional. On
the other hand, even if the seller is a subjective expected utility maximizer, she may have
a problem with formulating her (possibly complex) beliefs explicitly in order to implement
the classical optimal auction in practice.
Motivated by the above observations, in this paper we treat the distribution as un-
known and consider a problem of finding an optimal distributionally robust mechanism,
i.e. a mechanism that provides the best worst-case expected revenue where the worst
case is over all joint distributions of values lying in a large class. (The values are private
and known by the bidders.) The class of distributions consists of all distributions with
a known vector of means and known bounds for support. One may think of the known
vector of means and bounds for support as the best low-dimensional educated guess that
the seller has about the joint distribution of values, incorporating her beliefs or knowledge
about the possible asymmetry of the buyers.
We restrict attention to deterministic ex post mechanisms, with ex post meaning
dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex post individually rational, a term used
by Segal (2003). The motivation for this property is standard: one would like, in line
with Wilson doctrine (Wilson, 1987), to make a mechanism robust to misspecification of
bidders’ beliefs1. This is even more important in our setting where the seller is concerned
about the misspecification of her own prior and thus does not have a natural guess for the
bidders’ common prior, if one exists. The restriction to deterministic mechanisms may be
motivated by the fact that, as noted by Bergemann et al. (2016), randomization may be
1Chung and Ely (2007) give a maxmin foundation to dominant-strategy incentive compatibility under
the assumption of known regular value distribution. We do not know whether an analogous foundation
holds in our setting.
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difficult for a seller to credibly commit to. Also, randomized mechanisms may be quite
complex. We note, however, that this restriction is with loss of revenue, as randomization
typically yields improvement in maxmin optimization problems. Despite the restrictions,
the set of mechanisms we consider is still quite large: for example, instead of having an
include-all auction, one may first conduct an auction among buyers 1 and 2, and if the
object fails to be allocated, then approach buyer 4 with a price that depends on values
reported in the first auction, and if the object fails to be allocated still, approach buyers
3 and 5 with an auction designed depending on all previous reports, and so on2.
The main result of the paper says that the considered maxmin problem admits a
simple solution that we call a linear score auction (LSA). Its defining feature is that
the winner of the auction is the bidder whose linear score is the highest, provided it is
nonnegative. Linear scores are bidder-specific linear3 functions of bids4. Transfers are
pinned down by incentive compatibility in the standard way. Note that this mechanism
can be regarded as a linear version of the Myersonian optimal auction: indeed, that
auction under asymmetric value distributions is effectively a (generically) nonlinear score
auction in which the scores equal to bidders’ ironed virtual values. The difference between
Myersonian optimal auction and linear score auction is illustrated in figure 1. Also note
that when all score functions are identical, the linear score auction reduces to the usual
second-price auction with a reserve price. Thus, the distributional robustness of this
common auction format be an additional rationale for using it in practice.
The proof of the result uses strong linear programming duality. To get a duality-
free intuition for why the result is true, consider the following simple example. Suppose
there are two bidders with valuations lying in [0, 1] and expected valuations of m1 and
m2 satisfying m1 + m2 ≥ 1. Consider the simple second-price auction without reserve,
which is one feasible linear score auction. Consider any distribution F satisfying the
above constraints. Under any profile of values (v1, v2) ∈ supp(F ) with v1 > v2 the first
bidder wins, and the seller gets v2. Note, however, that if Nature transfers probability
mass from (v1, v2) to (1, v2) the seller’s revenue does not change, but E(v1) increases.
The same is true for profiles with v2 > v1. Thus, for any distribution F there exists a
2Because we assume that the values are known by the bidders, there are no informational spillovers
in the sequential mechanism, so one may model it as a one-shot game.
3Here, we use the term “linear” in the calculus sense of the word, i.e. the functions are, in fact,
possibly affine.
4Our score auction has nothing to do with scoring auctions commonly used in procurement (see, e.g.,
Che (1993)). In procurement scoring auctions, a score combines information about a bidder’s costs and
the quality of her good. Here, a score combines information about a bidder’s valuation and the prior
information on that valuation’s distribution.
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Figure 1: In a Myersonian optimal auction with asymmetric value distributions (left), the
boundary determining which bidder gets the object respects the intricacies of bidders’
value distributions. In a linear score auction (right), the boundary is linear . Digits 1
and 2 denote areas of value space where the corresponding bidders get the object. Zero
denotes areas where the object is kept by the seller.
distribution Fˆ satisfying EFˆ max{v1, v2} = 1, EFˆ vi ≥ mi, such that the seller’s revenue is
the same. But then, after moving from F to Fˆ , Nature can redistribute mass within the
set {v : max{v1, v2} = 1} so that the means are lowered back to mi and the seller’s
revenue decreases. (This is possible exactly when m1 + m2 ≥ 1.) This shows that
a seller caring about the worst-case can restrict attention to distributions F satisfying
EF max{v1, v2} = 1. Call such distributions “potentially worst-case distributions”. The
above argument is valid for any feasible mechanism that always allocates the good. But
then, because of the identity
EF (min{v1, v2}) + EF (max{v1, v2}) ≡ m1 +m2,
the expected revenue of the SPA under a potentially worst-case distribution is equal to
EF (min{v1, v2}) = m1 + m2 − 1. That is, when seller uses the SPA (and not some
mechanism with nonlinearities that always allocates the good), her expected revenue
depends on a (potentially worst-case) distribution F only through the known means mi.
This is a clear sign of robustness5.
The actual proof starts with an observation that the seller’s objective function is equal
to the convex closure of a mechanism’s transfer function, evaluated at the point m where
5The analysis in this example does not prove that the SPA is optimal – when means are different, it
is not, even among the mechanisms that always allocate the good. It merely shows why mechanisms of a
specific form, of which SPA is an example, yield robustness and thus are good candidates for an optimal
mechanism.
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m is the vector of means. Using an analytic representation of convex closures afforded by
a classic strong duality result, we then show that for any feasible mechanism there exists a
linear score auction that does no worse. This construction is the heart of the paper. While
one can ascertain the validity of the construction visually in the case of two bidders, the
proof is trickier in higher dimensions. The key to the construction is that the vector of
(generalized) “reserve prices” for the desired revenue-improving linear score auction comes
from a fixed point of a certain piecewise-linear map derived from the original mechanism.
The existence of such a fixed point is guaranteed by Brouwer theorem. However, not any
fixed point can yield the desired construction. Thus, analyzing the structure of the set of
fixed points constitutes a major part of analysis.
Solving a finite-dimensional optimization problem, we then characterize the set of
optimal parameters for the LSA. Qualitatively, the optimal auction is similar to the My-
ersonian solution: the optimal auction discriminates against stronger bidders (those with
larger means) to reduce their information rents and intensify competition among all bid-
ders. This is manifested in the fact that for a fixed bid b, the score of a stronger bidder
is lower than the score for a weaker bidder. However, there are new features. First,
there may be multiple optimal vectors of parameters. This a common scenario in maxmin
optimization problems. Second, when bidders are symmetric, the set of optimal vectors
of reserve prices depends on n: it decreases in n in strong set order and includes zero
for all sufficiently high n. This contrasts with the Myersonian solution where the reserve
price does not depend on n with symmetric bidders. This may be interpreted as evidence
that competition is a more powerful device to protect against low-revenue distributions
than a reserve price, so the latter is no longer needed when the number of bidders is
sufficiently large. Finally, when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric, a new phenomenon
of weak exclusion arises: it may be weakly optimal to exclude a (low-mean) bidder from
an auction completely. This may never happen in the classical model when value distri-
butions have overlapping supports. This is because the weak bidder’s value is expected
to be so low that including the bidder does not change the worst-case expected revenue.
Interestingly, weak exclusion may happen only if n ≥ 3 and only if the means of other
bidders’ valuations are sufficiently high.
The main result only implies that some optimal mechanism takes the form of linear
score auction. However, as alluded to above, in general many mechanisms can share the
same worst-case expected revenue. In section 6, we characterize the whole set of optimal
mechanisms for the case of two bidders. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only
if it is “sufficiently close” to the optimal linear score auction in a certain sense. When
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means are sufficiently high, the “safe neighborhood” of the optimal LSA collapses in a
way that any optimal mechanism must coincide with the LSA in an area where the values
are relatively high.
1.1 Related literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature on robust mechanism design. The closest
contributions to ours are Carrasco et al. (2018a), Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017), Neeman (2003)
and Suzdaltsev (2020). Carrasco et al. (2018a) study the problem of selling the good to a
single agent by seller who maximizes worst-case expected revenue while knowing the first
N moments of distribution. They characterize the optimal randomized mechanism, and
also the optimal deterministic posted price for the case when a mean and upper bound is
known, as in our paper. Their approach also effectively uses duality. Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017)
study, among other settings, second-price auctions with reserve price when there are n
symmetric bidders with a known lower bound for (the common) E(vi). They characterize
the optimal reserve price but do not study the question of whether the SPA is an optimal
deterministic mechanism. They also show that randomized mechanisms yield strictly
more revenue in this setting. Neeman (2003) finds the optimal reserve price in a similar
setting where the set of distributions is the same as in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017), but the
criterion is the worst-case ratio of expected revenue to expected full surplus, rather than
expected revenue itself. Finally, Suzdaltsev (2020) proves that a maxmin reserve price in
a second-price auction is equal to seller’s valuation when the values are iid and the mean,
and an upper bound on either values or variance is known. Because of the independence
constraint, the proof in the latter paper is not based on duality.
Bose et al. (2006) show that when the seller has an arbitrary set of iid priors that
includes the bidders’ common prior, an auction that equalizes ex post revenue is opti-
mal. However, to implement such an auction, the seller still has to know the bidders’
common prior, as the paper assumes Bayesian, rather than dominant-strategy, implemen-
tation. The paper also considers the case of maxmin optimization on the part of bidders.
He and Li (2019) seek an optimal reserve price in an SPA when a (common) marginal
distribution of every bidder’s value is known but the correlation structure is unknown.
They find that the optimal deterministic reserve price goes to zero when the number of
bidders grows without bound, which is in accord with our results. Carroll (2017) studies
the problem of multidimensional screening where again marginals, but not the correla-
tion structure, are known. Carrasco et al. (2018b) study mechanism design where a single
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agent’s utility is nonlinear in allocation and all distributions with given bounds for support
and mean are possible. Auster (2018) considers optimal design for a buyer in a lemons
problem where all distributions of seller’s costs are possible. Azar and Micali (2013) find
a maxmin-optimal posted price mechanism (among posted price mechanisms only) for
the case where there is an unlimited supply of the good and mean and variance of ev-
ery bidder’s marginal value distribution are known. Bergemann and Schlag (2011) study
monopoly pricing problem when there is local uncertainty about the distribution while
Bergemann and Schlag (2008) consider minimax-regret pricing when only bounds for a
single buyer’s possibly non-stochastic value are known. Relatedly, Bandi and Bertsimas
(2014) consider an auction design problem with non-stochastic adversarial private values.
They provide a general algorithm for computing a maxmin randomized mechanism in the
multi-item case and prove that a second-price auction with a reserve price is a maxmin
mechanism in the single item case for any bounded uncertainty sets.
Wolitzky (2016) studies optimal mechanisms for bilateral trade when agents are maxmin
optimizers, with their uncertainty sets being similar to the one studied in the present pa-
per (a buyer knows only the mean of a seller’s valuation and bounds on its support, and
vice versa). He also proposes a foundation for such uncertainty sets via agents’ uncer-
tainty over each other’s information structures. Unfortunately, such a microfoundation
is not directly applicable to the present paper’s set-up because of our assumption that
correlation between values can be arbitrary.
Another strand of literature has concentrated on establishing the performance bounds
of “simple” mechanisms, relative to optimal ones. For example, Azar et al. (2013) show,
among other results, that when bidders’ values are independent, distributions’ hazard
rates are monotone, and the vector of means m is known, running a second-price auction
with the vector of individual reserves equal to m ensures no less than 1
2e
of the optimal
Myersonian revenue. Note that this approach implicitly tries to minimize the worst-case
relative regret rather maximize the worst-case performance per se. Other important con-
tributions in this vein include Hartline and Roughgarden (2009), Dhangwatnotai et al.
(2015) and Allouah and Besbes (2020). Note that the present paper shows that the dis-
tinction between “simple” and optimal may not exist when optimality is in the maxmin
sense: a relatively simple mechanism (an LSA) is optimal.
This worst-case optimality of a “simple” mechanism or policy has been a result in
several papers from various literatures. For instance, Iancu et al. (2013) demonstrate
worst-case optimality of affine decision rules in a family of dynamic optimization prob-
lems while Carroll (2015) shows that a linear contract is optimal in a robust version of
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a principal-agent model. Our proposed mechanism features piecewise-affine functions re-
lating one’s payment upon winning to other bidder’s values. We note, however, that the
simplicity of a maxmin solution is not a general rule: for example, in Brooks and Du
(2019) (see below) the optimal mechanism is quite complex.
A natural idea when type distribution is unknown is to ask the agents about it (see,
e.g., Brooks (2013)). We rule out such schemes as we assume that bidders may lack such
information themselves. Another approach is to try to infer the distribution of a bidder’s
value from other bidders’ reports and then compute the empirical virtual value functions
(Segal, 2003). The latter schemes are feasible in the present paper but they turn out not
to be (strictly) optimal: intuitively, to run them successfully, the seller has to have some
prior knowledge of the values’ correlation (best if values are conditionally iid) which she
lacks by assumption. Segal (2003) is also one of the first papers that characterized an
optimal ex post mechanism with correlated private values, which is a generalization of the
Myersonian optimal mechanism. It is this mechanism that our paper seeks to “robustify”
rather than the Cremer and McLean (1988) mechanism that is not ex post6.
A related problem in robust design is finding mechanisms robust to misspecification
of agents’ information structures, rather than the designer’s prior. Brooks and Du (2019)
identify an optimal mechanism in the common value setting, while Du (2018) identifies a
simple mechanism that asymptotically extracts full surplus. This strand of literature still
assumes a shared common prior between the designer and agents and that bidders’ infor-
mation structures are common knowledge among them. The present paper, in contrast,
dispenses with both of these assumptions but assumes a rather narrow set of informa-
tion structures: the seller knows that every buyer’s information structure is such that she
knows her value. Thus, our approach may be seen as complementary to theirs, albeit only
indirectly so as our analysis does not apply to the case of interdependent values, which is
the focus of the aforementioned papers.
Others kinds of robustness explored in the economics literature include robustness to
technology or preferences, robustness to strategic behavior and robustness to interaction
among agents and are surveyed by Carroll (2018).
There also exists a large literature on distributionally robust non-mechanism-design
optimization in operations research, with the case of “known moments” being popular.
This literature has been apparently pioneered by an economist (Scarf, 1958). It is thought
that distributionally robust models may help bridge the gap between sometimes overly
6Segal (2003) characterizes the mechanism under a restrictive assumption on conditional virtual values.
See, e.g., Papadimitriou and Pierrakos (2011) for a treatment of a more general case.
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conservative solutions from non-stochastic adversarial models (Ben-Tal et al., 2009) and
stochastic programming solutions that require precise knowledge of a probability dis-
tribution over uncertain parameters. See Wiesemann et al. (2014), See and Sim (2010),
Goh and Sim (2010), Delage and Ye (2010), Popescu (2007) and references therein.
Finally, the seller in our model may be seen as ambiguity-averse. Note that our model
conforms to the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model of maxmin expected utility when
one takes the set of all value profiles as the set of states of the world, and mechanisms as
acts, because the set of priors we consider is convex. This would fail had we assumed, for
instance, that values are known to be independent but the exact distribution is unknown.
1.2 Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in section 2, then set the stage
for the proof of the main result in section 3 and present the proof itself in section 4. We
then find and present the parametric solutions and discuss comparative statics in section
5. Section 6 discusses the set of optimal mechanisms, section 7 – worst-case distributions,
and section 8 – some extensions. Section 9 concludes. All omitted proofs are stated in
Appendix A.
2 Model
Notation. Statements of the form “for all i” should be interpreted as “for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}”. Symbols without subscripts may refer to either scalars or vectors. This
should not create confusion in most cases. v′ > v for vectors means that v′i > vi for all i,
and similarly for v′ ≥ v. ık is a vector of ones of size k. Value vectors are column vectors.
Dual variable λ is a row vector.
One indivisible object may be sold to one of n ≥ 2 potential buyers. Buyers know
their values for the object, vi, which may be correlated. The seller knows that buyers
know their values; however, she lacks detailed information about the joint distribution F .
She only knows that (1) the support of F is contained in [0, v]n for some v > 0 and (2)∫
vidF = mi, i = 1, . . . , n. Denote by ∆(m, v) the set of all Borel distributions on [0, v]
n
satisfying these conditions. The seller’s valuation of the object is zero. Denote by V the
set of possible vectors of values V ∈ [0, v]n and by V−i the set of vectors of values of all
bidders except i (V−i = [0, 1]n−1).
We restrict attention to dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex post individu-
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ally rational mechanisms. The definitions of these properties are standard. Further, here
we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms such that each bidder
gets the good with probability 0 or 1 under any reported profile of valuations v. Finally,
we apply Revelation principle, and consider only direct mechanisms 7.
Denote a direct deterministic mechanism by M = {xi(v), ti(v)}, i = 1, . . . , n, where
xi(·) are measurable allocation functions [0, v]n → {0, 1} satisfying
∑n
i=1 xi(v) ≤ 1 and
ti(·) are measurable transfer functions [0, v]n → R.
Denote the set of dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex post individually
rational deterministic mechanisms by M. Denote the seller’s expected revenue given
mechanism M and distribution F by
R(M,F ) :=
∫ n∑
i=1
tMi (v)dF.
Then, the problem that we consider in this paper (and the seller considers herself) is
sup
M∈M
inf
F∈∆(m,v)
R(M,F ). (1)
Denote the value of the inner problem in (1), by R(M). That is, R(M) is the revenue
guarantee of a mechanism M .
The main result is that problem (1) admits a solution belonging to a simple class of
mechanisms described below.
Definition 1. Define bidder i’s linear score si(vi) by si(vi) := βivi−αi where αi ≥ 0, βi >
0 are bidder-specific parameters. A linear score auction is a mechanism {x(v), t(v)} ∈ M
such that for i = 1, . . . , n:
xi(v) =


1, si(vi) > max{max
j 6=i
sj(vj), 0}
0, si(vi) < max{max
j 6=i
sj(vj), 0}.
(2)
for some αi, βi ≥ 0.
Note that a linear score auction with αi = r, βi = 1 corresponds to the usual second-
price auction with the reserve r. Hence, a linear score auction may be regarded as a
simple generalization of the second-price auction that accounts for possible asymmetries
7For details of this, see Appendix B.
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between bidders. Note also that 2n parameters αi and βi are determined only up to one
normalizing constant.
Definition 2. A linear score auction is a corner-hitting linear score auction if and only
if, for some r ∈ [0, v]n, βi = 1v−ri , αi = riv−ri if ri < v and βi = 1, αi = ri if ri = v.
The qualifier “corner-hitting” comes from the fact that in a depiction of such an auc-
tion’s allocation function, the boundary separating the areas of value space corresponding
to different bidders getting the object goes in the corner. Parameters r may be thought
of as generalized reserve prices (see figure 2).
Equivalently, a corner-hitting linear score auction is a linear score auction such that
for every bidder i, her maximum possible score is either one (when ri < v) or zero (when
ri = v).
v1
v2
v
v
r
r
1
2
0
v1
v2
v
v
r1
r2
1
2
0
v1
v2
v
v
r1
r2
1
2
0
Figure 2: Three linear score auctions with two bidders. A standard second-price auction
with a reserve price r (left), and two asymmetric auctions favoring bidder 1 (center and
right). Note that the rightmost auction is not a corner-hitting linear score auction, while
the other two are.
Theorem 1. For every mechanism M ∈ M, there exists a corner-hitting linear score
auction LSA0 such that R(LSA0) ≥ R(M).
Proposition 1. There exists a corner-hitting linear score auction that maximizes the
revenue guarantee R(M) among all corner-hitting linear score auctions.
Corollary 1. There exists a mechanism that solves (1) and is a corner-hitting linear
score auction.
Note that theorem 1 establishes the form of only one optimal mechanism; in general
there exist other optimal mechanisms, and there may even be multiple optimal mecha-
nisms that are linear score auctions (see section 6 below).
A well-known characterization of the setM (given in, e.g., Segal (2003)) is as follows.
11
Lemma 1. A mechanism {xi(v), ti(v)} ∈ M if and only if for each bidder i there exist
a function pi: [0, v]
n−1 → [0, v] and a function zi : [0, v]n−1 → R+ such that for every
valuation profile v ∈ [0, v]n,
xi(v) =

1, vi > pi(v−i)0, vi < pi(v−i); (3)
ti(v) = pi(v−i)xi(v)− zi(v−i). (4)
Lemma 1 follows directly from the standard characterization of dominant-strategy
incentive-compatibility: monotonicity of the allocation function and the envelope formula
that pins down transfers (up to a constant) as a function of allocation.
Second, revenue maximization in 1 implies that at the optimum zi(v−i) ≡ 0.
Lemma 1 leaves room for determining allocation for v such that vi = pi(v−i) for some
i. As we allow for discrete distributions (and the worst-case distributions will turn out
to be discrete, see section 7), the determination of allocation on this measure-zero set
(“tie-breaking rule”) a priori might matter for the expected revenue (although it won’t in
fact matter for the optimal mechanism).
Thus, finding an optimal mechanism in the set M boils down to (1) finding threshold
functions pi(v−i) such that the bidder i gets the object and pays pi(v−i) if his report is
higher than pi(v−i); (2) determining the tie-breaking rule.
Note that for any corner hitting linear score auction functions pi have a certain simple
form:
pi(v−i) = ri + (v − ri)max
{
0, max
j∈I(r)\{i}
vj − rj
v − rj
}
; (5)
for some r ∈ [0, v]n. where the set I(r) is given by {i : ri < v}.
In what follows, we will use a shorthand notation LSA(r), with some ri possibly equal
to v, to refer to a corner-hitting linear score auction in which i ∈ I if and only if ri < v,
and threshold functions are given by (5) for the parameter vector r.
3 Preparations for the proof: duality
First, we reformulate the inner problem in (1) (Nature’s problem) using an appropriate
linear programming duality result. This allows for a more tractable expression reflecting
the dependence of the worst-case expected revenue on the mechanism.
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A revealing characterization of worst-case revenue under a given mechanism M is as
follows. Denote by conv[t] the convex closure of the function t, i.e. for all v ∈ [0, v]n,
conv[t](v) := inf{R|(v, R) ∈ conv(graph(t))} where conv(graph(t)) is the convex hull of
the graph of t(·).
Lemma 2. For any mechanism M ,
R(M) = conv[tM ](m). (6)
The intuition behind the representation (6) is exactly as in Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011): Nature can achieve expected revenue R with some feasible distribution if and
only if (m,R) is in the convex hull of graph of tM , so the minimal possible revenue is
achieved at the lower boundary of the convex hull, similar to how the highest sender’s
utility is achieved at the upper boundary of a convex hull of V (µ) at the point µ0 in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Whereas in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the con-
straint is that µ0, the prior belief, has to be the mean of posterior beliefs, here the
constraint is that m has to be the mean of values. Even though the representation (6) is
intuitive, it is not yet particularly convenient for solving the mechanism design problem.
Fortunately, by Fenchel-Moreau-Rockafellar duality theorem (see Bonnans and Shapiro
(2000), theorem 2.113), convex closure of a function can be equivalently represented as
the function’s biconjugate, that is,
conv[tM ](m) = sup
λ∈Rn
(
λm+ inf
v∈[0,v]n
{
tM(v)− λv}) (7)
for all m ∈ (0, v)n.
Alternatively, one may have arrived at an expression (7) by considering the dual of
Nature’s linear problem directly, and invoking strong duality (Smith, 1995).
An important co-result useful in the proof of theorem 1 is that the supremum in (7)
is achieved:
Lemma 3. The supremum in (7) is achieved at some λ∗(M) ∈ Rn.
Lemma 3 follows from the results in Smith (1995) as the transfer function is bounded
from below. In Appendix A, we provide a direct proof of this lemma.
The λ∗(M) are the optimal dual variables and the Lagrange multipliers on the mean
constraints in Nature’s problem. If unique, λ∗ may also be interpreted as the local slope of
the convex closure of tM(v) atm. Note that we allow for both positive and negative lambda
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– this stems from our specification of mean constraints as equalities. In Appendix C, we
give examples of mechanisms for which λ∗i < 0 for some i. Note that for such mechanisms
the seller’s revenue counterintuitively decreases in mi for such i. It is a priori not evident
that such mechanisms are suboptimal; however, it will follow from the proof of theorem
1 that they indeed are. In section 8, we discuss an alternative setting with inequality
constraints in which one may restrict λ to be nonnegative a priori.
Given a mechanism M , partition [0, v]n into n + 1 sets W0, W1,. . .,Wn where Wi,
i = 1, . . . , n, are sets of valuations such that bidder i gets the object, and W0 is the set of
valuations such that no one gets the object. Then, the value of(7) is equal to
λm+min{ min
i=1,...,n
inf
v∈Wi(p)
(pi(v−i)− λv), inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λv)} (8)
The sets Wi are determined, up to tie-breaking, by the functions pi(·). The tie-breaking
rule may be specified by disjoint sets Oi ⊂ {v : vi = pi(v−i)} such that Wi = {v : vi >
pi(v−i)} ∪ Oi, i = 1, . . . , n. If the indifference is between granting the object to a bidder
and not granting it at all, it is always harmless to grant the object to someone, so we let
sets Oi satisfy ∪ni=1Oi = ∪ni=1{v : vi = pi(v−i)}\∪ni=1{v : vi > pi(v−i)}. Note that this also
implies that the setW0 is defined with strict inequalities: W0 = {v : vi < pi(v−i) for all i}.
W0 may be empty.
The following lemma shows that (1) one can safely ignore sets Oi when optimizing
over threshold functions p; (2) one can extend Wi to certain intersecting sets such that
the infimum (8) does not change. This extension is important for the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma 4. For any λ ∈ Rn and any mechanism M ∈ M, the value of (8) is the same
as the value of
λm+min{ min
i=1,...,n
inf
v∈W≥i (p)
(pi(v−i)− λv), inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λv)} (9)
where W≥i (p) := {v : vi ≥ pi(v−i)}, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof: Consider some bidder i and some profile of values v0 ∈ W≥i (p)\Wi(p). It must
be that v0i = pi(v
0
−i). Either pi(v
0
−i) < v or pi(v
0
−i) = v. Suppose first that pi(v
0
−i) < v.
Then, any neighborhood of v0 has a nonempty intersection with {v : vi > pi(v−i)}, and
hence, with Wi(p). Thus, pi(v
0
−i)− λv0 ≥ inf
v∈Wi(p)
(pi(v−i)− λv) which means that adding
v0 to Wi(p) won’t change the value of (8).
Now suppose that pi(v
0
−i) = v. Because v
0 ∈ W≥i (p) \Wi(p), v0 ∈ {v : vi = pi(v−i)}
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and thus v0 ∈ ∪ni=1{v : vi = pi(v−i)}. Also, v0 /∈ Oi. Suppose first that v0 ∈ ∪ni=1{v : vi =
pi(v−i)} \ ∪ni=1{v : vi > pi(v−i)}. By condition 3, v0 ∈ ∪ni=1Oi and hence v0 ∈ Oj for some
j 6= i. Hence, v0 ∈ Wj(p) for some j 6= i. Now suppose that v0 ∈ ∪ni=1{v : vi > pi(v−i)}.
Again, as v0i = pi(v
0
−i), it means that v
0 ∈ Wj(p) for some j 6= i. This ensures the second
inequality in the following chain:
pi(v
0
−i)− λv0 = v − λv0 ≥ pj(v0j )− λv0 ≥ inf
v∈Wj(p)
(pj(v−j)− λv), (10)
Thus, adding v0 to Wi(p) won’t change the value of (8). 
Lemma 4 is not trivial because sets W≥i (p) are not merely closures of Wi. Whereas
the projection of Wi on V−i may be a strict subset of V−i, the projection of W
≥
i (p) on V−i
is the whole V−i = [0, v]n−1 (recall that pi(v−i) ≤ v)).
As using strong duality converts the inner problem into a maximization problem, one
may collapse the outer and the inner problem into a single maximization problem. Thus,
the final reformulation of the problem (1) may be stated as
Choose measurable functions pi(v−i) : [0, v]n−1 → [0, v] and λ ∈ Rn to maximize
R(p, λ) := λm+min{ min
i=1,...,n
inf
v∈W≥i (p)
(pi(v−i)− λv), inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λv)} (11)
subject to supply constraint: ∀i 6= j and ∀v ∈ [0, v]n, vi > pi(v−i) implies vj ≤ pj(v−j),
where W≥i (p) := {v : vi ≥ pi(v−i)}, i = 1, . . . , n, W0 = {v : vi < pi(v−i) for all i}.
Note that R(M) = sup
λ
R(p, λ) where p are the threshold functions representing mech-
anism M . Also note that even though R(p, λ) gives the value of the worst-case expected
revenue only for tuples of functions p satisfying the supply constraint, it is well-defined
for all tuples of functions pi(v−i) : [0, v]n−1 → [0, v], i = 1, . . . , n.
4 Proof of theorem 1
Suppose we are given a mechanism M0 ∈ M, represented by threshold functions p.
Compute an optimal λ∗ ∈ Rn that maximizes R(p, λ) given p (such a lambda exists by
Lemma 3). We will construct a linear score auction LSA0 with threshold functions pˆ
such that either R(pˆ, λ∗) ≥ R(p, λ∗) (in Grand case I below) or R(pˆ, λ∗∗) ≥ R(p, λ∗∗) ≥
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R(p, λ∗) for some λ∗∗ (in Grand case II). When lambda is reoptimized for the LSA0,
the value of R(pˆ, λ) will be even (weakly) higher.
The construction of the dominating LSA depends on λ∗ and is qualitatively different
depending on whether λ∗ has negative components or not.
Grand case I. λ∗i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Note that for every v−i ∈ [0, v]n−1, the value profile (v, v−i) ∈ W≥i (p). Given this fact
and the fact that λ∗i ≥ 0, for every i
inf
v∈W≥i (p)
(pi(v−i)− λ∗v) = inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v−i)− λ∗−iv−i − λ∗i v).
Thus, (11) may be simplified further to
R(p, λ∗) = λ∗m+min{ min
i=1,...,n
inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v−i)− λ∗−iv−i − λ∗i v), inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v)} (12)
Step 1. The main idea is to replace each threshold function pi(·) with a simpler
function in such a way that the worst-case revenue (12) does not decrease. To this end,
given a function pi(v−i) and λ∗, compute
bi := inf
w∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(w)− λ∗−iw)
and then for every v ∈ [0, v]n−1 define
p˜i(v−i) := max{λ∗−iv−i + bi, 0}. (13)
p˜i(v−i) may be thought of as the supporting hyperplane to the graph of pi(·) with a
given slope λ∗−i (with an appropriate truncation on the boundary of [0, v]
n−1). Such a
hyperplane exists even if pi(·) is not convex because it is not a supporting hyperplane at
a given point, but rather a supporting hyperplane with a given slope.
We replace each function pi(·) with p˜i(·).
Proposition 2. R(p˜, λ∗) ≥ R(p, λ∗).
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that each inner infimum in (12) is weakly greater
under p˜ than under p.
First, consider inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λv). Note that one can take w = v−i in the inner minimization
in (13) and hence pi(·) ≥ p˜i(·). Thus, W0(p˜) ⊆W0(p) and inf
v∈W0(p˜)
(−λv) ≥ inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λv).
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Now we prove that for all i, inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v−i)−λ∗−iv−i) = inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(p˜i(v−i)−λ∗−iv−i).
In this equation, LHS ≥ RHS because pi(·) ≥ p˜i(·). However, LHS ≤ RHS as well
because by (13), for every v−i, p˜i(v−i)−λ∗−iv−i ≥ inf
w∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(w)−λ∗−iw) = LHS. Hence,
LHS = RHS. 
v1
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Figure 3: Step 1. Taking the transformation p → p˜ for n = 2. On the left display
an arbitrary p1(v2) is in red and an arbitrary p2(v1) is in blue. On the right display,
the resulting p˜-functions are solid and the initial p-functions are dashed. λ1 = 0.5 and
λ2 ≈ 1.055.
Step 2. In this step, given p˜ we find an LSA that gives revenue no less than R(p˜, λ∗)
and hence, R(p, λ∗).
To this end, we use a fixed point of the map v → p˜(v) (The map defined for each i by
vi = p˜i(v−i).) Indeed, this is a continuous map from [0, v]n to itself, and thus, by Brouwer
Theorem a fixed point exists. Denote the set of fixed points by V ∗ 6= ∅.
We proceed by considering three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases concerning
the structure of V ∗.
Case 1. There exists an interior fixed point, but there are no fixed points with at
least one of coordinates equal to zero, i.e. V ∗ ∩ (0, v)n 6= ∅ and v∗ > 0 for all v∗ ∈ V ∗.
Case 2. There exists a fixed point with at least one coordinate equal to zero, i.e.
∃v∗ ∈ V ∗ : v∗i = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Case 3. There are no interior fixed points and no fixed points with at least one of
coordinates equal to zero, i.e. for all v∗ ∈ V v∗ > 0 and ∃i : v∗i = v.
Case 1. There exists an interior fixed point, but there are no fixed points with at
least one of coordinates equal to zero, i.e. V ∗ ∩ (0, v)n 6= ∅ and v∗ > 0 for all v∗ ∈ V ∗.
Take any interior fixed point v∗. It satisfies the equations vi = p˜i(v−i) for all i. As v∗
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is interior, v∗ > 0, and thus, by (13), it satisfies the system of linear equations
A(λ∗)v = b, (14)
where the matrix A(λ) of size n is given by
aij(λ) =

1, i = j;−λj , i 6= j, (15)
while bi := inf
w∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(w)− λ∗−iw), i = 1, . . . , n.
Next Lemma shows that, given the supposition in Case 1, matrix A(λ∗) should be of
full rank.
Lemma 5. If matrix A(λ∗) is singular and there exists a positive fixed point v∗ ∈ V ∗,
then V ∗ also contains a fixed point with a zero coordinate.
Proof: Suppose matrix A is singular. Then it follows from basic linear algebra that
the set of solutions to the system (14) includes the affine subspace {v∗+ avˆ|a ∈ R} where
vˆ is some nonzero solution to the homogeneous system Av = 0. By subtracting rows of A
it is easy to prove that, given λ∗i ≥ 0, if vˆ is a solution to Av = 0, all coordinates of vˆ must
be of the same sign. Without loss of generality, take the coordinate-wise positive solution
vˆ and consider a = −min
i
(v∗i /vˆi). Then, v˜ where v˜i = v
∗
i − min
i
(v∗i /vˆi)vˆi is a solution to
(14) which is nonnegative in all coordinates and equal to zero in at least one coordinate.
Also, it is less or equal to v∗ in every coordinate, so v˜ ∈ [0, v]n. Hence, v˜ is the desired
element of V ∗ that has a zero coordinate. 
Thus, as there are no fixed points with at least one of coordinates equal to zero by
assumption in Case 1, matrix A(λ∗) must be of full rank. Hence, V ∗∩(0, v)n is a singleton.
Now take the unique point v∗ ∈ V ∗ ∩ (0, v)n and consider LSA(v∗). Denote by pˆ the
threshold functions corresponding to LSA(v∗) (they are given by (5)). We prove that
LSA(v∗) gives revenue no smaller than the the tuple of threshold functions p˜.
Proposition 3. R(pˆ, λ∗) ≥ R(p˜, λ∗) in Case 1.
Proof: Again, it is sufficient to prove that each inner infimum in (12) is weakly
greater under pˆ than under p˜.
First, consider inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(p˜i(v−i)− λ∗−iv−i). It is sufficient to show that pˆ ≥ p˜ at every
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Figure 4: Step 2. Taking the transformation p˜ → pˆ (LSA(v∗)) for n = 2. On the left
display the fixed point v∗ of the map v → p˜(v) is identified. On the right display, the
auction LSA(v∗) is shown.
point. To this end, note that by definition of v∗ and p˜ (13), p˜i(v−i) may be rewritten as
p˜i(v−i) = max{v∗i + λ∗−i(v−i − v∗−i), 0}. (16)
Thus, we need to prove the inequality
max{v∗i + λ∗−i(v−i − v∗−i), 0} ≤ v∗i + (v − v∗i )max
{
0,max
j 6=i
vj − v∗j
v − v∗j
}
(17)
where the right-hand side is the expression for pˆ. Note that because v∗ ∈ (0, v)n, no
bidder is excluded from the auction LSA(v∗).
We will prove a slightly more general lemma that will be also of help later.
Lemma 6. Suppose χ∗−i ∈ Rn−1+ and v∗ ∈ [0, v]n are such that v∗i + χ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i) ≤ v
for all i. Denote by I(v∗) the set of indices i such that v∗i < v. Then, for all i and for all
v−i ∈ [0, v]n−1,
max{v∗i + χ∗−i(v−i − v∗−i), 0} ≤ v∗i + (v − v∗i )max
{
0, max
j∈I(v∗)\{i}
vj − v∗j
v − v∗j
}
. (18)
Proof: First, note that if the LHS of (18) is 0, the inequality holds.
Suppose it is not zero. Then note that
v∗i + χ
∗
−i(v−i − v∗−i) ≤ v∗i +
∑
j∈I(v∗)\{i}
χ∗j (vj − v∗j ) (19)
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because χ∗j(vj − v∗j ) ≤ 0 for j /∈ I(v∗).
Now consider an auxiliary linear optimization problem in |I(v∗)| − 1 variables
max
χj≥0
v∗i +
∑
j∈I(v∗)\{i}
χj(vj − v∗j ) (20)
s.t. v∗i +
∑
j∈I(v∗)\{i}
χj(v − v∗j ) ≤ v (21)
Whenever (vj − v∗j ) > 0 for at least one j ∈ I(v∗) \ {i}, the problem (20) is solved by
putting all weight on the variable with the highest “bang for the buck”, i.e.
χj =
v − v∗i
v − v∗j
for
j ∈ arg max
j∈I(v∗)\{i}
vj − v∗j
v − v∗j
and χj = 0 for other j. If (vj−v∗j ) ≤ 0 for all j, one should set χj = 0 for all j. Hence, the
maximum value of problem (20) is equal precisely to the RHS of (18). On the other hand,
χ∗ is feasible for the problem (20) as (21) holds for χ∗ due to the lemma’s supposition,
and the value of the objective function at χ∗ is precisely the RHS of (19). 
Now note that the supposition of lemma 6 holds for χ∗ = λ∗ and the unique v∗ ∈ V ∗
due to the fact that p˜i(vın−1) ≤ v. Also, I(v∗) = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Thus, applying lemma 6
to χ∗ = λ∗ and v∗ yields the desired inequality (17).
Second, consider inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v). We will prove that inf
v∈W0(pˆ)
(−λ∗v) = inf
v∈W0(p˜)
(−λ∗v).
Because, as we proved above, pˆ ≥ p˜, W0(p˜) ⊆ W0(pˆ) and hence, LHS ≤ RHS. Note
that LHS = −λ∗v∗ by the construction of LSA(v∗) and positivity of λ. To prove that
LHS ≥ RHS, we prove that v∗ is a limit point of the set W0(p˜).
Consider again the system (14). Because v∗ is the unique solution to it, matrix A
must be of full rank, and so A−1 exists. Consider the sequence vk = A−1(b− ın/k) where
ın is a vector of all ones of dimension n. v
k may not lie in (0, v)n for all k. However, vk
approaches v∗. Hence, it lies, after some k, in (0, v)n and, as Avk < b coordinate-wise, in
W0(p˜). 
Case 2. There exists a fixed point with at least one coordinate equal to zero, i.e.
∃v∗ ∈ V ∗ : v∗i = 0 for some i.
In this case, we will again prove that LSA(v∗) (again, call the respective threshold
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functions pˆ) provides a weakly higher revenue than p˜. The major novelty in this case
is that because v∗i = 0, v
∗ may not satisfy the system (14) (recall that v∗i = p˜i(v
∗
−i) =
max{λ∗−iv∗−i+ bi, 0} and so we only have that v∗i ≥ λ∗−iv∗−i+ bi if v∗i = 0). Due to this, the
representation (16) won’t hold for p˜ and one is not able to apply Lemma 6 directly.
To deal with this issue, we introduce auxiliary functions
pauxi (v−i) := max{v∗i + kiλ∗−i(v−i − v∗−i), 0}, (22)
where ki are individual-specific coefficients set in a way that the functions p
aux
i satisfy
conditions of Lemma 6, so pˆ ≥ paux, and simultaneously ensure that paux ≥ p˜.
That is, we prove the inequality pˆ ≥ p˜ not directly, as in Case 1, but, if necessary, via
the chain pˆ ≥ paux ≥ p˜.
v1
v2
v
v
v∗i
Figure 5: The auxiliary function paux2 (v1) helps establish the inequality pˆ ≥ p˜. pˆ2 is
depicted as a regular line, paux2 is dashed, p˜2 thick.
Proposition 4. R(pˆ, λ∗) ≥ R(p˜, λ∗) in Case 2.
Proof: Consider 4 sets of bidders: (i) those with v∗i = v; (ii) those with v
∗
i ∈
(0, v); (iii) those with v∗i = 0 and λ
∗
−i(vın−1 − v∗−i) > 0; (iv) those with v∗i = 0 and
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i) = 0.
We prove that for every type of bidder, pˆi ≥ p˜i.
First, if v∗i = v, then pˆi(v−i) ≡ v ≥ p˜i(v−i) ∀v−i.
Second, if v∗i ∈ (0, v), then the representation (16) is valid for p˜i and thus Lemma 6 is
applicable directly, with χ∗−i = λ
∗
−i, as in Case 1. Thus, pˆi ≥ p˜i.
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Third, suppose v∗i = 0 and λ
∗
−i(vın−1 − v∗−i) > 0. Define
ki :=
λ∗−ivın−1 + bi
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i)
. (23)
We prove that, with such a choice of ki, p
aux
i (v−i) ≥ p˜i(v−i) at any point v−i.
First, for v−i such that λ∗−iv−i < λ
∗
−iv
∗
−i, p
aux
i (v−i) = 0, so the inequality holds.
Now consider v−i such that λ∗−iv−i ≥ λ∗−iv∗−i. Any such point can be represented as a
convex combination of vın−1 and a point u satisfying λ∗−iu = λ
∗
−iv
∗
−i. Namely,
v−i = t · u+ (1− t) · vın−1,
where
t =
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v−i)
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i)
and
u = vın−1
λ∗−i(v
∗
−i − v−i)
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v−i)
+ v−i
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i)
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v−i)
.
t ≤ 1 due to the fact that λ∗−iv−i ≥ λ∗−iv∗−i.
p˜i is a convex function and thus
p˜i(v−i) = p˜i(t · u+ (1− t) · vın−1) ≤ tp˜i(u) + (1− t)p˜i(vın−1). (24)
However, p˜i(u) = max{λ∗−iu+ bi, 0} = max{λ∗−iv∗−i + bi, 0} = v∗i = 0. Moreover,
(1− t)p˜i(vın−1) = max
{
λ∗−i(v−i − v∗−i)
λ∗−i(vın−1 − v∗−i)
(λ∗−ivın−1 + bi), 0
}
= pauxi (v−i).
Combining this with (24) yields the desired inequality pauxi ≥ p˜i.
The second inequality pˆi ≥ pauxi , follows from Lemma 6 with χ∗−i = kiλ∗−i. Note that
the supposition of the Lemma 6 holds due to the fact that pauxi (vın−1) = p˜i(vın−1) by
construction and p˜i(vın−1) ≤ v.
Hence, pˆi ≥ pauxi ≥ p˜i as desired.
Fourth, suppose v∗i = 0 and λ
∗
−i(vın−1− v∗−i) = 0. As every term λ∗j (v− v∗j ) is nonneg-
ative, we must have λ∗j(v − v∗j ) = 0 for all j 6= i.
Denote by Jmax the set of indices j 6= i such that v∗j = v. Then it follows that
0 = v∗i = max{
∑
j∈Jmax
λ∗jv + bi, 0}.
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But then, due to nonnegativity of λ∗j ,
p˜i(v−i) ≤ max{
∑
j∈Jmax
λ∗jv + bi, 0} = 0.
Hence, p˜i(v−i) ≡ 0, and thus the inequality pˆi ≥ p˜i holds.
We have shown that for every i, pˆi ≥ p˜i. This implies that all inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v−i) −
λ∗−iv−i) increase when p˜i is replaced by pˆi. To cover the remaining infimum, inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v),
note that
inf
v∈W0(pˆ)
(−λ∗v) = +∞ > inf
v∈W0(p˜)
(−λ∗v), (25)
as W0(pˆ) = ∅ due to the fact that v∗i = 0 for some i, and so the object is always allocated
in LSA(v∗). 
Case 3. There are no interior fixed points and no fixed points with at least one of
coordinates equal to zero, i.e. for all v∗ ∈ V ∃i : v∗i = v, and v∗ > 0.
This is the hardest case to consider due to problems with comparing inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v) for
pˆ and p˜. On the other hand, W0(pˆ) 6= ∅ as v∗ > 0, so the comparison via (25) cannot be
made. On the other hand, as v∗ is not interior, a sequence approaching v∗ and lying in
W0(p˜) might not exist, so the argument made in Case 1 may not be valid.
Whether or not v∗ is a limit point of the set W0(p˜) now depends on the geometry of
the p˜i functions in a neighborhood of the point, which is governed by the properties of
the matrix A(λ∗).
In two dimensions, this can be illustrated by the following pictures:
It turns out that in general the type of geometry is determined by the sign of det(A).
Fortunately, it can be computed explicitly. The formula, along with other properties of
A to be used, is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For a matrix A(λ), given by (15), with λ ≥ 0, the following statements hold:
1. det(A) =
(
1−
n∑
i=1
λi
1+λi
)
n∏
i=1
(1 + λi).
2. If det(A) > 0, all elements of A−1 are nonnegative.
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Figure 6: Two types of geometry of threshold functions around the fixed point (v, v). In
both pictures, p˜1(v2) is in red and p˜2(v1) is in blue. In the left picture, det(A) > 0 while
in the right picture, det(A) < 0. Note that in the right picture there exists another fixed
point w∗ with w∗1 = 0.
3. If v∗ is the unique solution to Av = b, then
λv∗ =
n∑
i=1
λi
1+λi
bi
1−
n∑
i=1
λi
1+λi
.
4. The rank of A is at least n− 1.
Now consider two subcases separately.
Subcase 1.
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
< 1.
In this subcase, det(A) > 0 and p˜i exhibit the same type of geometry as in figure 6,
left.
In this case, we show that, as usual, LSA(v∗) dominates p˜ (one can take any v∗ ∈ V ∗).
For bidders with v∗i < v, the proof that pˆi ≥ p˜i is entirely as in Cases 1 and 2 (by Lemma
6), since v∗ > 0. If v∗i = v, pˆi ≡ v ≥ p˜i.
Now consider inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v). As in Case 1, inf
v∈W0(pˆ)
(−λ∗v) = −λ∗v∗ by the definition of
threshold functions for the linear score auction. We show that v∗ is a limit point of the
set W0(p˜) so inf
v∈W0(pˆ)
(−λ∗v) ≥ inf
v∈W0(p˜)
(−λ∗v).
Note that because v∗ > 0, v∗ satisfies the system (14) A(λ∗)v = b. Consider the
sequence vk = A−1(b− ın/k). (A−1 exists as det(A) > 0.) This sequence satisfies Avk <<
b. Most importantly, by Lemma 7, part 2, vk = v∗ −A−1ın/k ≤ v∗ as all elements of A−1
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are nonnegative. Hence, vk lies in [0, v]n for all k sufficiently large, and thus vk ∈ W0(p˜).
Thus, vk → v∗ is the desired sequence showing that v∗ is a limit point of W0(p˜).
Subcase 2.
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
≥ 1. In this subcase, det(A) ≤ 0 and p˜i exhibit the same type of
geometry as in figure 6, right.
We will show that in this subcase, there must, along with v∗, exist a fixed point
w∗ ∈ V ∗ such that at least one coordinate of w∗ is equal to zero. Hence, this subcase is
incompatible with the premise in Case 3.
Suppose that
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
= 1. Then det(A) = 0 and thus the desired fixed point w∗ exists
by Lemma 5.
From now on, suppose that
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
> 1.
First, we show that when constructing a desired fixed point w∗ , one can, in a certain
sense, ignore all bidders with v∗i < v (where v
∗ is the initial fixed point considered in Case
3). Indeed, by the premise of Case 3 there exists bidder j such that v∗j = v. Thus,
v = p˜j(v
∗
−j) = λ
∗
−jv
∗
−j + bj ≤ λ∗−j + bjvın−1 ≤ v, (26)
where the first inequality is due to λ∗ ≥ 0 and the second is due to p˜j(v) ≤ v. Hence, all
inequalities hold as equalities and thus λ∗−j(vın−1 − v∗−j) = 0. But every term in this sum
is nonnegative, so we must have λ∗i (v − v∗i ) = 0 for all i 6= j. Thus, for all i with v∗i < v
we must have λ∗i = 0. But this means that the values of all such bidders do not impact p˜j
for j such that v∗j = v. (Call this set of bidders Jmax again.) Hence, it is sufficient to find
a desired fixed point restricted to the set of bidders Jmax. To see this formally, denote by
[0 w˜∗] a vector consisting of zeros at coordinates j /∈ Jmax and of w˜∗j for j ∈ Jmax. Then,
if a point w˜∗ ∈ [0, v]|Jmax|, satisfies the system w˜i = p˜i([0 w˜]−i) for all i ∈ Jmax, with some
w˜∗i = 0, the point w
∗ given by
w∗j =

w˜
∗
j , j ∈ Jmax;
p˜j([0 w˜
∗]), j /∈ Jmax
will satisfy the whole system vi = p˜i(v−i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with some w∗i = 0.
Hence, it is with loss of generality to consider v∗ = vın. Since vın is a positive fixed
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point, it must satisfy Av = b, so for all i we get
bi = (1−
∑
j 6=i
λ∗j)v. (27)
The main idea to construct a fixed point w∗ with w∗i = 0 whenever bi < 0. So we
first show that such an i is guaranteed to exist in this subcase. This is achieved by the
following lemma:
Lemma 8. Suppose λ1, . . . , λn are nonnegative numbers satisfying
∑
i 6=k
λi ≤ 1 (28)
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then,∑ni=1 λi1+λi ≤ 1. Moreover, if at least one of the inequalities
(28) is strict, then
∑n
i=1
λi
1+λi
< 1.
Indeed, suppose bi ≥ 0 for all i. Then, by (27),
∑
i 6=k
λ∗i ≤ 1
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, so λ∗i satisfy the premise of Lemma 8. Hence,
∑n
i=1
λi
1+λi
≤ 1
but this contradicts our premise that
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
> 1. Hence, there exists j such that bj < 0.
From now on, enumerate bidders in such a way that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn.
If b1 ≤ 0, 0 · ın is the desired fixed point. Indeed, then we have 0 = max{bi, 0} =
p˜i(0ın−1) for all i. So assume b1 > 0. Hence, there exists s∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} such that
bs ≥ 0 for all s ≤ s∗ and bs < 0 for all s > s∗.
We will construct a fixed point w∗ such that w∗i = 0 for i > s
∗. Denote by Arestr the
restricted matrix formed by first s∗ rows and columns of A. Denote by brestr the vector
formed by the first s∗ elements of b.
Because, b1 > 0, bi ≥ 0 for i = 2, . . . , s∗, by Lemma 8 we must have
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
< 1.
Thus, by Lemma 7, part 1, matrix Arestr is of full rank.
So define w∗ by
w∗j =

((A
restr)−1brestr)j, j ≤ s∗;
0, j > s∗.
Proposition 5. w∗ ∈ V ∗ and w∗i = 0 for some i.
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Proof: The fact that w∗i = 0 for some i follows from s
∗ < n.
Now we show that w∗ ∈ [0, v]n. w∗ ≥ 0 by the fact that brestr ≥ 0 and Lemma 7, part
2. Due to the fact that vın ∈ V ∗, it must be that
Arestr)−1vıs∗ − vıs∗
∑
i>s∗
λ∗i = b
restr
or
vıs∗ = (A
restr)−1
(
brestr + vıs∗
∑
i>s∗
λ∗i
)
,
so again by Lemma 7, part 2, (Arestr)−1brestr ≤ vıs∗ , so w∗ ≤ vın.
By construction, w∗ satisfies first s∗ equations of the system vi = p˜i(v−i). It remains
to show that it satisfies the equations s∗ + 1, . . . , n, that is
0 = max
{
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗iw
∗
i + bj , 0
}
,
for j > s∗. By the ranking of bi, it is sufficient to show that
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗iw
∗
i ≤ −bs∗+1.
Writing the LHS using Lemma 7, part 3, we get
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
bi
1−
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
≤ −bs∗+1.
Substituting for bi from (27), after simplifications one gets
λ∗s∗+1 ≥
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗2i
1+λ∗
i
− ∑
i 6=s∗+1
λ∗i + 1
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
. (29)
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But (29) is true because
λ∗s∗+1 >
1∑
i 6=s∗+1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
− 1 ≥
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗2i
1+λ∗i
− ∑
i 6=s∗+1
λ∗i + 1
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
,
where the first inequality is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
> 1, the supposition in Subcase 2, and
the second is equivalent to
s∗∑
i=1
λ∗i ≤
∑
i 6=s∗+1
λ∗i .

Thus, we have constructed a fixed point w∗ ∈ V ∗ with a zero coordinate which shows
that Subcase 2 is impossible within Case 3.
This finishes the consideration of Grand case I.
Grand case II. λ∗i < 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n.
Here, given p and λ∗, we pinpoint a pair of another mechanism and a nonegative vector
λ∗∗ which gives a strictly higher R thus reducing the problem to Grand Case I.
Denote the set {i|λ∗i ≥ 0} by +(λ∗) and the set {i|λ∗i < 0} by −(λ∗). Define q :=
|{i|λ∗i < 0}|. Redenote threshold functions by pi(v+, v−) where the profile of values of
bidders from +(λ∗) is v+ and the profile of values of bidders from −(λ∗) is v−.
For all bidders i ∈ +(λ∗), define pnewi (v−i) := pi(v+, 0) and for all bidders i ∈ −(λ∗)
define pnewi (v−i) := v. The transformation works as if bidders from −(λ∗) are removed
from the auction.
Lemma 9. R(pnew, λ∗) ≥ R(p, λ∗).
Proof: Again, we consider separately different infima in (11).
First, note that all infima inf
v∈W≥i (p)
(pi(v−i) − λ∗v) for i ∈ −(λ∗) are increased as
pnewi (v−i) = v ≥ pi(v−i) (the increase will be both due to direct rise in pi and the shrinkage
of the set W≥i (p).)
Second, consider inf
v∈W≥i (pnew)
(pnewi (v−i)−λ∗v) for i ∈ +(λ). As before, inf
v∈W≥i (p)
(pi(v−i)−
λv) = inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v
+
−i, v
−
−i)−λ∗−iv−i−λ∗i v). For pnew, this infimum is equal to inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v
+
−i, 0)−
λ∗+−i v
+
−i − λ∗−−i v−−i − λ∗i v). But note that the minimand in latter infimum is nondecreasing
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in v−−i, due to the sign of λ
∗−
−i . Hence, inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v
+
−i, 0) − λ∗+−i v+−i − λ∗−−i v−−i − λ∗i v) =
inf
v−i∈[0,v]k−1
(pi(v
+
−i, 0)−λ∗+−i v+−i−λ∗i v) =: R0. On the other hand, the point (v+−i, 0) is feasible
in the minimization in inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v
+
−i, v
−
−i)−λ∗−iv−i−λ∗i v). Hence, this second infimum
is not greater than inf
v−i∈[0,v]k−1
(pi(v
+
−i, 0) − λ∗+−i v+−i − λ∗i v) = R0. Thus, the values of such
infima do not decrease when going from pi(v−i) to pi(v+, 0) = pnew.
Finally, consider inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v). We will prove that, inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v) is no less than
at least one infimum in the expression for R(p, λ∗), written as in (12), and the statement
of this Lemma will follow. Note that unlike all previous steps, here we will not show that
inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v) necessarily dominates a similar infimum, inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v). Rather, we will
show that it is either greater than inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v) or greater than inf
v∈W≥j (p)
(pj(v−j) − λ∗v)
for some j.
If W0(p
new) is empty, the infimum in the new mechanism is equal to +∞ and thus is
trivially higher than inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v). So suppose W0(pnew) is nonempty. Consider mini-
mizing sequences vk ∈ W0(pnew) for the problem inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v). Note that there exists
a minimizing sequence vk such that for all i ∈ −(λ∗), vki = 0 for all k, since for all
v ∈ W0(pnew), (v+, 0) ∈ W0(pnew) and λ∗i < 0. Consider such a sequence.
Case 1. vk ∈ W0(p) starting from some k. This implies that inf
v∈W0(p)
(−λ∗v) ≤
lim
k→∞
(−λ∗vk) = inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v) which implies the Lemma.
Case 2. vk /∈ W0(p) for infinitely many k. Thus, as there is only a finite number of
bidders, there exists j∗ such that vkj∗ ≥ pj∗(vk−j∗) for infinitely many k. Consider hereafter
only this subsequence. Recall that vk ∈ W0(pnew) for all k. If j∗ ∈ +(λ∗), we would have
pj∗(v
k
−j∗) = p
new(vk−j∗) > v
k
j∗ ≥ pj∗(vk−j∗), a contradiction. So j∗ ∈ −(λ∗) and thus for all
k vkj∗ = 0 ≥ pj∗(vk−j∗) ≥ 0. So pj(vk−j∗) = 0 for all k. Moreover, vk ∈ W≥j∗(p) for all k.
Hence, inf
v∈W≥
j∗
(p)
(pj(v
k
−j∗)− λ∗v) ≤ lim
k→∞
(0 − λ∗vk) = inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λ∗v) which again implies
the lemma. 
Now consider a vector λ∗∗ obtained by replacing λ∗i for i ∈ −(λ∗) with zeros.
Lemma 10. R(pnew, λ∗∗) > R(pnew, λ∗).
Proof: We will prove that the minimal of all infima in (11) won’t change when λ∗i
for i ∈ −(λ∗) are replaced with zeros. Since mi > 0, revenue will strictly increase.
Note that the infima except inf
v∈W≥i (pnew)
(pnewi (v−i)−λ∗v) for i ∈ −(λ∗) are minimized by
setting vj = 0 for all j ∈ −(λ∗). This will continue to hold when λ∗i is replaced with λ∗∗.
29
Thus, replacing λ∗ with λ∗∗ will not change any infimum except inf
v∈W≥i (pnew)
(pnewi (v−i) −
λ∗v) = v(1−∑j∈+(λ∗) λ∗j−λ∗i ) for i ∈ −(λ∗). But note that none of inf
v∈W≥i (pnew)
(pnewi (v−i)−
λv), i ∈ −(λ∗), is strictly minimal of all the infima, for both λ = λ∗ and λ = λ∗∗. Indeed,
if +(λ∗) 6= ∅, one can take any j ∈ +(λ∗) and consider inf
v∈W≥j (pnew)
(pnewj (v−j)− λv). Since
the point vs =

v, s ∈ +(λ
∗) ∪ {i};
0, o/w
is feasible, and pnewj (·) ≤ v, this infimum is weakly
lower than inf
v∈W≥i (pnew)
(pnewi (v−i) − λv) = v(1 −
∑
j∈+(λ∗) λj − λi) for both λ = λ∗ and
λ = λ∗∗. If, on the other hand, +(λ∗) = ∅, inf
v∈W0(pnew)
(−λv) is lower, as it is equal to
0 < v(1− λi) for both λ = λ∗ and λ = λ∗∗. 
Along with Lemma 9, we get the inequality R(pnew, λ∗∗) > R(p, λ∗).
Finally, to find an LSA that dominates pnew, and thus, p, feed the pair [pnew, λ∗∗] to
Grand Case I. This is possible because all entries of λ∗∗ are nonnegative. Note that
now the tilde-transformation will be applied to pnew. Also, even though the whole vector
λ∗∗ might not be an optimal one for the mechanism pnew, this does not create a problem
since optimality of λ∗ is not used throughout constructions in Grand Case 1. 
The proof of theorem 1 is complete.
5 Parametric solutions
Theorem 1 identifies the form of an optimal mechanism. It remains to identify optimal
values of the parameters ri. To do this, one has to maximize R(p, λ) where functions p are
given by (5) for some r, both with respect to r and λ. Note that it follows from lemma
10 that any optimal mechanism M∗ is such that its optimal Lagrange multiplier λ∗(M∗)
is nonnegative. Together with proposition 1, this implies that that in finding the optimal
linear score auction, one can restrict oneself to λ ≥ 0.
Before one optimizes over r and λ, one has to solve the inner minimization problems
in (8). This is done in the proof of the following lemma:
Lemma 11. Suppose threshold functions p are given by (5) and λ ≥ 0. Then,
R(p, λ) =


λm+min
{
v (1−∑λi) ,min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λiv),−λr
}
, r > 0,
λm+min
{
v (1−∑λi) ,min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λiv)
}
, o/w.
(30)
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The two cases arise because when ri = 0 for some i, W0(p) = ∅, so inf
W0(p)
(−λv) jumps
to +∞ at all such points.
One approach to maximize this function of 2n variables would be to maximize first
over λ and then over r. This corresponds to finding explicitly the worst-case revenue for
every linear score auction and then finding the best auction. Even though this might
seem a more natural approach, it turns out to be more cumbersome.
So we optimize first over r and then over λ instead. Abusing notation, denote the
revenue function by R(r, λ). The function r → R(r, λ) is piecewise-linear and potentially
discontinuous at points where ri = 0 for some i. Maximization suggests that at least two
of the arguments of the minimum operator in (11) should be equal to each other at an
optimum, but it is unclear a priori, which two (or more). Fortunately, one can show that
(1) when
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≤ 1, all arguments but v (1−∑λi), must be equal to each other; (2)
the case
∑
i
λi
1+λi
> 1 is uninteresting from the standpoint of overall optimization over r
and λ. This is stated in the following two lemmas.
Given λ ≥ 0, define the point r∗(λ) by
r∗i (λ) :=
λi
1 + λi
v.
Lemma 12. If
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≤ 1, r∗(λ) solves the problem max
r
R(r, λ).
Lemma 13. Suppose (λ0, r0) is a solution to max
r,λ
R(r, λ). Then,
∑
i
λ0i
1+λ0i
≤ 1.
In the proof of lemma 12, we build an iterative procedure that at each iteration moves
the price vector r to equalize a growing number of arguments of the minimum operator
in (30), terminating when all but v (1−∑λi) are equal to each other, implying that it
finishes at r∗(λ). Using the condition
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≤ 1, we show that at each step the value of
(30) does not decrease. The prices r with ri = 0 for some i are treated in a special way.
It follows from lemmas 12, 13 that any optimal Lagrange multiplier λ∗ solves the
following problem:
max
λ≥0
n∑
i=1
miλi − λ
2
i
1 + λi
v (31)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
≤ 1 (32)
Recall from the proof of theorem 1 that the constraint (32) ensures that the determi-
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nant of the matrix A(λ) is nonnegative. It is no coincidence that this constraint appears
also in the present part of analysis. Indeed, if this constraint is violated, the transformed
threshold functions (p˜) are mutually located as in figure 6, right. But in this case, pro-
ceeding to the revenue-improving LSA improves revenue strictly as threshold functions
are moved strictly up (except at one point), and the object is allocated at every value
profile. Hence, the initial mechanism (which could be itself an LSA) was suboptimal8.
Thus, the constraint (32) eliminates situations with the “wrong” implied geometry of p˜.
We refer to it as “geometry constraint”.
The solution to the problem (31) differs depending on whether the geometry constraint
(46) binds. If the constraint does not bind, the solution can be easily computed to be
λ∗i =
√
v
v −mi − 1.
Thus, the geometry constraint binds whenever
∑
i
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
≥ 1, that is, when
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v ≤ n− 1,
i.e., when the means are relatively high. Whether this inequality holds will determine two
different regimes for the solution of the optimal auction problem.
When the geometry constraint (32) binds, the nonnegativity constraints might also
start to bind for bidders whose means are relatively low (even though the means are high
overall.) The full solution to the problem (31)-(32) is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Enumerate bidders in such a way that m1 ≤ m2 ≤ . . . ≤ mn. The solution
to the problem (31)-(32) is as follows:
1. If
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v > n− 1,
λ∗i =
√
v
v −mi − 1 for all i. (33)
8This is a geometric intuition behind the (algebraic) proof of Lemma 13.
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2. If
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v ≤ n− 1,
λ∗i =


0, i < k∗;
n∑
j=k∗
√
v−mj/(n−k∗)
√
v−mi − 1, i ≥ k∗,
(34)
where k∗ = min
{
k ≤ n− 1|
n∑
i=k+1
√
v−mi√
v−mk > n− k − 1
}
.
The bidders with λ∗i = 0 will be the ones who can be excluded from the auction
without loss of worst-case revenue. For a given bundle of parameters (m, v), denote the
set {i : λ∗i = 0} by WE(m, v) – those are bidders that are weakly excluded. Denote the
complement set of bidders by SI(m, v) – those that are strictly included. Note that no
more than n− 2 bidders can be weakly excluded in any case. This may be explained by
the need to keep at least a minimal level of competition. It follows that no one can be
weakly excluded if n = 2.
Given the definition of k∗, the condition that ensures that no bidder gets weakly
excluded for n ≥ 3 is
√
v −m1 < n− 1
n− 2
n∑
i=2
√
v −mi
n− 1 .
That is, the lowest of the means has to be relatively high still.
Now, given the optimal λ∗ stated in lemma 14, we want to recover optimal reserve
prices r∗ for the linear score auction. Recall that by Lemma 12, r∗(λ) given by r∗i =
λi
1+λi
v
is an optimal vector of prices. However, there may be others. Indeed, at some of the steps
in the proof of Lemma 12, the inequalities may have been only weak. Carefully tracing
this leads to the following answer.
Proposition 6. The set of optimal generalized reserve prices for the corner-hitting linear
score auction is as follows:
1. If
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v > n−1 (means are low), there is a unique vector of optimal prices
r∗ given by
r∗i = v −
√
v(v −mi) for all i; (35)
2. If
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v ≤ n− 1 (means are high), a vector of reserve prices r∗ ∈ [0, v]n is
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optimal if and only if it is satisfies the following system


∑
i∈SI(m,v)
r∗i ≤ v;
v−r∗i
v−r∗j =
√
v−mi
v−mj for all i, j ∈ SI(m, v),
(36)
where SI(m, v) is the set of bidders for whom the optimal Lagrange multipliers λ∗,
as given by (34), are positive.
Note that if the means are high, the set of reserve prices for strictly included bidders
is one-dimensional. If some bidders are weakly excluded, the reserve prices ri for such
bidders can be set arbitrarily (and the exclusion is achieved when ri = v). Figure 7,
left, depicts areas of parameter space that correspond to low/high means and to the
presence/absence of weak exclusion for a specific example with n = 3. Figure 7, right,
shows the set of optimal price vectors for the case of high means if n = 2.
m1
m2
v
v
A
B
C
r1
r2
v
v
m
l
Figure 7: (Left.) Different regimes for the optimal solution depending on the means,
n = 3. One bidder’s value has a mean of m1 and the other two bidders’ values have a
mean of m2. In area A means are low and the vector of optimal reserve prices is unique.
In areas B and C means are high and there are multiple solutions. In addition, in area C
the bidder with the lowest mean is weakly excluded from the auction. (Right.) The set
of optimal price vectors in the high-means case if n = 2, m2 > m1.
As noted in the introduction, the solution features discrimination against stronger
bidders. Indeed, for any two bidders i, j ∈ SI(m, v), mi > mj implies r∗i > r∗j for any
optimal price vector r∗. This is consistent with the standard result in auction theory
(Myerson, 1981). The differences from the classic solution are weak exclusion of bidders
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discussed above, multiplicity of solutions and the fact that the optimal reserve price
depends on n in the symmetric case.
The multiplicity of solutions in the high-means case stems from the fact that many
auctions share the same relevant region of conv[tM(v)] and induce the same worst-case
distribution. This distribution is such that the sale always happens (see more on this in
section 7). Note, however, that the (generalized) reserve prices also control the slope of
the boundary determining which bidder gets the object, which is important. This is why
the prices must belong to a certain line segment.
In the symmetric case, we obtain the following corollary of proposition 6:
Corollary 2. Suppose bidders are symmetric (mi = mj). Then, a second-price auction
with reserve price r solves problem (1) if and only if r = v−√v(v −m) and n < 1
1−
√
1−m/v
or r ∈ [0, v/n] and n ≥ 1
1−
√
1−m/v .
9
Thus, the set of optimal reserve prices decreases in strong set order and converges
to point zero as n → ∞. Thus, as competition increases, a reserve price is no longer
needed to protect the seller from low-revenue distributions. The result that a second-
price auction without a reserve is an optimal mechanism for n sufficiently high echoes
results in He and Li (2019) and Suzdaltsev (2020) who show that setting a reserve equal
to the seller’s own value is either exactly or asymptotically optimal in related maxmin
settings.
6 The set of optimal mechanisms
The proof of Theorem 1 establishes that a corner-hitting linear score auction is an optimal
mechanism in the considered environment. But do there exist other optimal mechanisms?
In other words, to what extent is linearity important for the optimality of the mechanism?
In this section, we study this aspect of the problem for the case of two bidders. We
characterize the whole set of optimal (deterministic) mechanisms. This set is far from
being a singleton. The features of the set turn out to depend significantly on whether the
means are low (
√
1−m1/v +
√
1−m2/v > 1) or high (
√
1−m1/v +
√
1−m2/v ≤ 1).
When the means are high, the optimal mechanism is pinned down uniquely for sufficiently
high values, that is, linearity of the relative boundary is indeed necessary for optimality.
9This parametric solution has been obtained by Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017). However, they take the auction
format as given.
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We start with a lemma that says that all optimal mechanisms induce the same La-
grange multipliers on the means constraints in Nature’s problem. Denote by R(M,λ)
the revenue under a mechanism M and Lagrange multipliers λ. Let λ∗(M) be any La-
grange multipliers solving the problem (7) (equivalently, max
λ
R(M,λ) for a mechanism
M .) Denote by LSAopt any optimal linear score auction.
Lemma 15. If a mechanism M0 solves problem (1), any solution λ∗(M0) to the dual of
Nature’s problem (7) given M0 coincides with λ∗(LSAopt), given by (33) and (34),
Proof: Denote by R∗ the optimal revenue achieved by any mechanism. AsM0 is opti-
mal, R∗ = R(M0, λ∗(M0)). By the proof of theorem 1, there exists a linear score auction
LSA0 such that R(M0, λ∗(M0)) ≤ R(LSA0, λ∗(M0)). Hence, R(LSA0, λ∗(M0)) ≥ R∗
and this LSA0 has to be, in a fact, an optimal LSA, LSAopt. Thus, λ∗(M0) has to be a
maximizer of R(LSAopt, λ). Such a maximizer is unique and is given by (33) and (34). 
The set of optimal mechanism for n = 2 is characterized in the following two proposi-
tions.
Proposition 7. Suppose
√
1−m1/v +
√
1−m2/v > 1. Let r∗i be the reserve prices
of the optimal LSA given by (35) and λ∗i be the optimal Lagrange multipliers given by
(33). Then, a mechanism (p1(v2), p2(v1)) solves problem (1) if and only if the following
conditions all hold:
1. pi(v−i) ≥ r∗i + λ∗i (v−i − r∗−i) for all v−i ∈ [0, v];
2. pi(v−i) ≤
(
λ∗1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2 − λ∗−iv−i
)
/λ∗i for v−i ≤ r∗−i;
3. pi(v−i) are weakly increasing for v−i ≥ r∗−i.
4. p1(v2) and p2(v1) are inverse to each other for vi ≥ r∗i whenever possible, i.e. for any
interval (v′1, v
′′
1), v
′
1 ≥ r∗1 such that p2(v1) is strictly increasing on it, p1(p2(v1)) = v1
for all v1 ∈ (v′1, v′′1), and similarly for p1(v2).
Proposition 8. Suppose
√
1−m1/v +
√
1−m2/v ≤ 1. Let λ∗i be the optimal Lagrange
multipliers given by (34). Note that λ∗1λ
∗
2 = 1. Let r
∗
i = λ
∗
i /(1+λ
∗
i )v be the highest optimal
reserve prices for the LSA. Then, a mechanism (p1(v2), p2(v1)) solves problem (1) if and
only if the following conditions all hold:
1. pi(v−i) = r∗i + λ
∗
i (v−i − r∗−i) for all v−i ≥ r∗−i;
2. pi(v−i) ≥ r∗i + λ∗i (v−i − r∗−i) for all v−i ∈ [0, v];
36
3. pi(v−i) ≤
(
λ∗1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2 − λ∗−iv−i
)
/λ∗i for v−i ≤ r∗−i.
In both propositions, sufficiency is easy to prove from the fact that for any mechanism
satisfying the conditions it can be verified that R(M,λ∗) = R∗. Necessity is trickier. The
main idea is that if one submits any optimal mechanism to the proof of theorem 1, the
resulting LSA should be an optimal one, characterized by proposition 6. This means that
one of fixed points of p˜, derived from M , must be an optimal vector of prices. Given that
we know the slopes of p˜ from lemma 15, this reconstructs p˜ for any optimal mechanism
M , thus yielding condition 1 in proposition 7 (per property p˜ ≤ p). Condition 2 in the
same proposition stems from the fact that for any optimal mechanism, inf
v∈W0
(−λ∗v) may
not be lower than that for the optimal LSA. Finally, conditions 3 and 4 in proposition
7 stem from the fact that the threshold functions for the optimal mechanism must both
satisfy supply constraint and be tight to each other, not allowing the “holes” that would
expand the set W0.
In proposition 8, the linearity of threshold functions (condition 1) is just a consequence
of the fact that that reconstructed p˜ are tight to each other, and thus, per the property
p˜ ≤ p and the fact that one shouldn’t expand the set W0 too much, threshold functions
must coincide with p˜ when values are sufficiently high. Because the threshold functions
are pinned down for vi ≥ r∗i , one does not have to prove analogs of conditions 3 and 4 of
proposition 7 in proposition 8.
The sets of optimal mechanisms in the low-means and high-means case are depicted
in figures 8 and 9. We see that in the low means case (figure 8) it is necessary that the
graphs of threshold functions of any optimal mechanism pass exactly through the point
(r∗1, r
∗
2). This signifies the fact that when means are relatively low, the main trade-off that
the seller faces is the trade-off between not selling the good and the prices upon selling and
not the trade-off between favoring bidder 1 or 2 when both values are above the reserve
prices. The existence of the area denoted by “0” shows that it is strictly optimal not
to sell the good sometimes. Note, however, that the threshold functions should be still
“close enough” to those of the optimal linear score auction, with the “safe neighborhood”
of the optimal linear score auction given by λ∗.
In the high-means case (figure 9), the “safe neighborhood” collapses so that the any
optimal mechanism should coincide with the optimal linear score auction for vi ≥ r∗i .
This stems from the fact that with high means, the probability of not selling the good
will be small anyway (provided that prices are not very high), so the main trade-off is
about designing the right mode of bidders’ competition. Note also that, as the “0” set
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v1
v2
v
v
r∗2
r∗1
0
Figure 8: Optimal mechanisms in a low-means case. n = 2, v = 1, mi = 0.64. r
∗
i = 0.4
and λ∗i = 2/3. The graphs of all optimal threshold functions must lie within the shaded
areas. A sample optimal mechanism is shown.
collapses, it becomes weakly optimal to always sell the object.
v1
v2
v
v
r∗2
r∗1
Figure 9: Optimal mechanisms in a high-means case. n = 2, v = 1, m1 = 0.75, m2 = 0.91.
r∗1 = 3/8, r
∗
2 = 5/8, λ
∗
1 = 1/λ
∗
2 = 0.6. The graphs of all optimal threshold functions must
coincide with the thick line within the unshaded area, and must lie above it within the
shaded area. The thick line itself represents an optimal mechanism – a linear score auction
that always allocates the good.
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7 Worst-case distributions
The proof of theorem 1 didn’t consider worst-case distributions thanks to the representa-
tion afforded by linear programming duality. However, knowing them may also be useful
to know how Nature reacts to a given mechanism and this gain a deeper understand-
ing of the game between the seller and Nature. In this section, we discuss worst-case
distributions for corner-hitting linear score auctions (not necessarily optimal ones).
The worst-case distributions can be deduced from a complementary slackness result
in Smith (1995). Namely, it follows that for any mechanism M any distribution solving
the inner problem (1) also solves the unconstrained problem
inf
F∈∆
{
tM (v)− λ∗(M)v} ,
where λ∗(M) is the solution to the dual problem (7) for the mechanismM and ∆ is the set
of all Borel distributions on [0, v]n. That is, if a worst-case distribution exists, its support
must be contained in set of minimizers of the function tM(v)− λ∗(M)v over [0, v]n.
Consider n = 2 and any corner-hitting linear score auction with parameters r =
(r1, r2). Before we proceed, we change the rules a little by stating that when vi ≤ ri for
i = 1, 2, the object is unsold. This does not change the infimum over distributions but
ensures that a worst-case distribution always exists. Then, when λ∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2 (it
will happen whenever ri < mi) it follows immediately from the structure of the function
tLSA(v) that the support of any worst-case distribution is contained in the set
S∗ := {(r1, r2)} ∪ {v : vi ≥ ri,max{v1, v2} = v}.
Depending on the means m and prices r, different subsets of the set S∗ may be selected
as the support of a worst-case distribution. It turns out that there may be three types of
worst-case distributions when ri < mi, described in the following table:
Type Support
I Any subset of {v : vi ≥ ri,max{v1, v2} = v}
II {(r1, r2), (r1, v), (v, r2)}
III {(r1, r2), (r1, v) or (v, r2), (v, v)}
Figure 10 shows how the support of the worst-case distribution depends on prices r
for fixed means m. Interestingly, if prices are relatively low, Nature chooses a distribution
such that sale happens with probability 1 and does not try to “undercut” the seller.
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Only when prices rise beyond a certain boundary, Nature starts to induce no trade with
positive probability in the worst case. When prices rise even further, Nature switches
from inducing negative correlation between values (so that the lowest bid is always very
low) to inducing positive correlation (so that two bidders are effectively replaced by one).
r1
r2
v
v
I
II
III
m1
m2
Figure 10: Different types of distributions are worst-case for different prices r
Define r2(r1) :=
m2(v−r1)−v(v−m1)
m1−r1 .
Proposition 9. Suppose n = 2 and and consider a corner-hitting linear score auction
with parameters r1 < m1 and r2 < m2. The rules are modified so that when vi ≤ ri for
i = 1, 2, the object is unsold. Then, the set of worst-case distributions is a subset ∆WC of
∆(m, v) such that for every F ∈ ∆(m, v):
1. If r2 < r2(r1) and r2 < v − r1, F ∈ ∆WC if and only if supp(F ) ⊆ {v : vi ≥
ri,max{v1, v2} = v};
2. If r2 > r2(r1) but r2 < v−r1, F ∈ ∆WC if and only if supp(F ) = {(r1, r2), (r1, v), (v, r2)};
3. If r2 > v − r1, F ∈ ∆WC if and only if supp(F ) ⊆ {(r1, r2)} ∪ {v : v1 = v, v2 ≥ r2}
or supp(F ) ⊆ {(r1, r2)} ∪ {v : v2 = v, v1 ≥ r1}.
Note that F is pinned down from the means constraints and the support if the support
contains three points.
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8 Extensions
8.1 Different upper bounds
In this section, we analyze the case where the seller may put different upper bounds
on different bidders’ values. For simplicity, we focus on the case of two bidders and
assume that the support of the joint distribution F is contained in [0, v1]× [0, v2] for some
v1 ≥ v2 > 0.
The optimality of linear score auctions still holds. The difference is that the optimal
linear score auction ceases to be a corner-hitting linear score auction.
Theorem 2. Suppose v1 ≥ v2. Then there exists a mechanism M∗ that solves (1) and
is a linear score auction with parameters β1 = γ, α1 = γr1, β2 = 1, α2 = r2 for some
ri ∈ [0, vi] and γ ∈ R+.
v1
v2
v1
v2
r1
r2
1
2
0
v1
v2
v1
v2
r1
r2
1
2
0
Figure 11: Two linear score auctions with two bidders. The first auction may be subop-
timal with upper-bound asymmetric bidders. Unlike the case v1 = v2, one may stictly
prefer the boundary “hitting the wall” (right picture) rather than “hitting the corner”
(left). Digits 1 and 2 denote areas of value space where the corresponding bidders get the
object. Zero denotes areas where the object is kept by the seller.
The parametric solution is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Suppose v1 ≥ v2. Then,
1. If
√
1−m1/v1 +
√
1−m2/v2 > 1, the optimal prices r∗i are unique and given by
r∗i = vi −
√
vi(vi −mi), i = 1, 2. (37)
The optimal slope γ∗ is not unique; γ∗ is optimal if and only if
γ∗ ∈
[
r∗1
v1 − r∗1
,
v2 − r∗2
r∗2
]
. (38)
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2. If
√
1−m1/v1 +
√
1−m2/v2 ≤ 1, the optimal slope γ∗ is unique and given by the
(unique) positive solution to the equation
v1 − v2
(γ + 1)2
+
v2 −m2
γ2
= v1 −m1. (39)
The optimal pair of prices is not unique; (r∗1, r
∗
2) is optimal if and only if

v2−r∗2
v˜1−r∗1 = γ
∗
r∗
1
v1
+
r∗
2
v2
≤ 1,
where v˜1 =
γ∗v1+v2
γ∗+1
≤ v1 is the minimum reported value of bidder 1 such that she
wins regardless of the second bidder’s report.
8.2 Different lower bounds
The main result and its proof is almost unchanged if the seller puts different lower bounds
vi on bidder’s values that can also differ from the seller’s own valuation c (but the upper
bound is still the same). Note, however, that in the “gap case” (c < maxi vi) the paramet-
ric solution will be substantially different from the one identified in section 5. As setting
ri lower than vi raises the worst-case probability of sale discontinuously to one, the seller
will sometimes strictly prefer such “sure-sale” linear score auctions to the ones identified
in the baseline case. The part of the above analysis that fails in this case is lemma 12, as
now discontinuity in (30) starts playing a role.
8.3 Inequality constraints
Throughout the analysis, we have maintained the assumption that the mean of the valua-
tion vector distribution is known exactly, i.e. the mean constraint is an equality constraint.
This assumption has required additional work to rule out negative Lagrange multipliers
in Grand case II. of the proof of the main result; in contrast, had we assumed that
only a lower bound for the mean is known (as in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017)), we would get
the nonnegativity of λ for free. We think that the equality constraint is a more plausible
modeling choice under the “educated guess” interpretation of the known mean assump-
tion. Note, however, that the inequality constraint may be a better choice when the mean
information comes from data obtained from previous auctions with the same bidders. It
is well-recognized that in that case bidders, anticipating that their reports will affect the
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design of a future auction, may strategically shade their bids in an otherwise truthful
mechanism10. Thus, such data will indeed provide only a lower bound on the valuations’
means. It is therefore warranted to articulate the following result.
Corollary 3. The set of optimal mechanisms is the same regardless of whether the seller
knows that E(v) = m or E(v) ≥ m.
Proof: Recall that under the equality constraint the transformed problem was
to maximize R(p, λ) given by (11) over threshold functions p and λ ∈ Rn. Under the
constraint E(v) ≥ m transformed problem becomes maximize R(p, λ) over p and λ ∈ Rn+.
Then the result follows from the fact that any solution (p∗, λ∗) to the original problem
involves λ∗ ≥ 0 by lemma 10. 
It might be also interesting to consider the problem in which the seller knows that
E(vi) ∈ [mi, mi] for all i. It follows from our result that λ∗(M∗) ≥ 0 for any optimal
mechanism M∗ in the known means case, that in such a problem the set of optimal
mechanisms is exactly the same as the set of optimal mechanisms for the case when the
means are known to be mi. This result is not trivial, as there exist mechanisms under
which worst-case revenue may be lower for higher mi (see Appendix C), and it is nor a
priori clear that such mechanisms are suboptimal.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a solution to a basic distributionally robust mechanism design
problem – the problem of allocating an indivisible good among n buyers in a manner
that maximizes worst-case expected revenue when the seller knows only means of value
distributions and an upper bound on their support. The identified solution is simple
and may be thought of as a linear version of the classic solution for the case where value
distributions are known (Myerson, 1981). The proof is based on strong linear programming
duality, a geometric construction and an analysis of the set of fixed points of a certain
piecewise-affine map. We then solved the parameter-tuning problem and identified two
regimes for the parametric solution. We compared and contrasted the identified solution
to the classic one, and characterized the full set of solutions in the two-bidder case. The
linearity of the boundary determining the bidder getting the object is indeed necessary
for optimality if the known means are sufficiently high.
10Kanoria and Nazerzadeh (2017) propose an approximate solution to the incentive problem for the
case of iid values. It is less clear how to alleviate it in the case where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric and
may have correlated values.
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The analysis is certainly not free of limitations that are simultaneously avenues for
future research. Some of those are as follows:
• Randomized mechanisms. It is well-known that randomized solutions perform
strictly better in robust optimization problems thanks to their ability to provide
hedging against various Nature’s strategies. Thus, our restriction to deterministic
mechanisms is certainly with loss of revenue. In fact, it follows from our results and
theorem 11 in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017) that
inf
m
R∗det(m)
R∗rand(m)
= 0,
where R∗det(m) and R
∗
rand(m) are the best revenue guarantees of a deterministic and
randomized mechanism when all bidders’ values have the same mean m. In this
sense, the loss of revenue can be significant and it is certainly interesting to know
what an optimal randomized mechanism is. However, there are two caveats to the
above ratio analysis. First, it follows from the analysis in Koc¸yig˘it et al. (2017)
that the infimum is achieved only when m → 0, but then both R∗det(m) → 0 and
R∗rand(m) → 0 which may not represent an interesting scenario: it is not of great
practical importance that one revenue is infinitely smaller than the other if both
are infinitely small. Second, and relatedly, it follows from results in Carrasco et al.
(2018a) that for the case of one bidder supm (R
∗
rand(m)− R∗det(m)) ≈ 0.1331v. Thus,
if there is a cost of C > 0.1331v of using a randomized mechanism (say, due to its
complexity — and numerical analysis shows that it is quite complex), it will be an
optimal decision for the seller to use a deterministic mechanism regardless of mean
m even if randomization is feasible. We expect a similar argument hold for the case
of multiple bidders as well.
• Higher moments. The proof of the main result in the present paper cannot be
easily modified to accommodate higher moments constraints. It follows again from
strong duality that the natural candidate optimal threshold functions if k moments
are known are polynomials of degree k (see Carrasco et al. (2018a) for the case
of one bidder). Note, however, that using such polynomials on the full domain is
very likely to be infeasible due to the supply constraint. To resolve the conflict and
determine the winner of the object it may be necessary to draw a boundary that may
be linear still. One natural higher-moment constraint is the nonnegative covariance
constraint. Because the function v2 → v1v2 is linear, a similar tilde-transformation
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can be used to establish the optimality of a linear score auction under known mean
and nonnegative covariance if there are two bidders. However, it is unclear whether
the result is true for n ≥ 3 (due to the presence of terms pi(vi)− ζvjvk, i 6= j 6= k,
in the dual problem).
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Appendix A: omitted proofs
Proof of proposition 1: Denote by R(r, λ) the value of (11) when the threshold
functions p are given by (5) for some r ∈ [0, v]n. The revenue guarantee of the auction
is given by R(r) := max
λ∈Rn
R(r, λ) (supremum is achieved by lemma 3). We will prove that
R(r) is upper semi-continuous, which implies the result. Note that R(r, λ) is continuous
on (0, v]n × Rn, so, by Berge’s theorem argument R(r) is continuous on (0, v]n. Also,
R(r, λ) is continuous on R0 × Rn (when its domain is restricted to R0 × Rn ) so R(r) is
continuous on R0 when its domain is restricted to R0. Hence, to show that R(r) is upper
semi-continuous on full domain, it is sufficient to show that for every sequence of points
rk ∈ (0, v]n with limit r ∈ R0, we have lim
k→∞
R(rk) ≤ R(r).
To this end, extend the function R(r, λ) from (0, v]n to the whole [0, v]n by continuity
and call the extension Rext(r, λ) with Rext(r) = max
λ∈Rn
Rext(r, λ). Note that Rext(r, λ) ≤
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R(r, λ) and thus Rext(r) ≤ R(r) if r ∈ R0, and Rext(r, λ) = R(r, λ), Rext(r) = R(r) other-
wise. By the usual argument, Rext(r) is continuous. Thus, lim
k→∞
R(rk) = lim
k→∞
Rext(rk) =
Rext(r) ≤ R(r). 
Proof of Lemma 2: Obviously, an equivalent definition of the convex closure of
t is inf{α|(v, α) ∈ conv(graph(t))}.. On the other hand, by the result of Smith (1995),
inf
F∈∆(m,v)
R(M,F ) = inf
F∈∆fin(m,v)
R(M,F ) where ∆fin(m, v) is a subset of ∆(m, v) consisting
of all distributions with finite support. So it is sufficient to prove that inf{α|(m,α) ∈
conv(graph(t))} = inf
F∈∆fin(m,v)
R(M,F ). But this is certainly true, as one of definitions of
a convex hull of a subset S of Euclidean space is the set of all finite convex combinations
of points in S. 
Proof of lemma 3: Denote the function being maximized in (7) by G(λ): Rn → R.
This function is concave; thus it is continuous. First, observe that for any unbounded
sequence λk, the sequence G(λk) is unbounded from below. To see this, note that if λki is
not bounded from above, one can set vi = v in minimization in (7), whereas if λ
k
i is not
bounded from below, one can set vi = 0; hence, G(λ
k) is majorized by a sequence that is
unbounded from below.
Now take any maximizing sequence λk (i.e. a sequence such that lim
k→∞
G(λk) =
sup
λ
G(λ)). As the sequence G(λk) is clearly bounded from below, by the above ob-
servation we know that λk must lie in a bounded set Q. Therefore it has a subsequence
λks converging to some λ∗ ∈ cl(Q) ⊂ Rn. But then, by continuity of G, sup
λ
G(λ) =
lim
s→∞
G(λks) = G(λ∗). 
Proof of lemma 7: Consider the homogeneous system Av = 0. By subtracting row
j > 1 from row 1 one gets (1+λ1)v1 = (1+λj)vj for all j > 1. Plugging this in equation 1,
one gets
(
1−∑ni=1 λi1+λi
)
v1 = 0. Thus, the system has a unique (trivial) solution if and
only if 1 6=∑ni=1 λi1+λi . Thus, det(A) = 0 if and only if 1 =∑ni=1 λi1+λi . Because determi-
nant is a multilinear function of rows of A, it must be equal to C
(
1−
n∑
i=1
λi
1+λi
)
n∏
i=1
(1+λi)
for some C ∈ R. As det(A(0)) = 1, C = 1. This proves part 1. It also follows that the
set of solutions to the system is at most one-dimensional. This proves part 4.
To prove parts 2 and 3, consider a non-homogeneous system Av = b. By subtracting
rows as above one obtains that its unique (provided that det(A) 6= 0) solution v(b) is
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given by
vi(b) =
bi
(
1−∑
k 6=i
λk
1+λk
)
+
∑
k 6=i
λk
1+λk
bk
(1 + λi)
(
1−
n∑
i=1
λi
1+λi
) .
As A−1ij = ∂vi/∂bj , part 3 follows from λ ≥ 0 and det(A) > 0. Part 4 follows from the
above analytic solution and the fact that λv(b) = (1 + λ1)v1(b)− b1. 
Proof of lemma 8: The proof is by solving the optimization problem max
λ
∑n
i=1
λi
1+λi
subject to (28) and the nonnegativity constraint. The solution is λi = λj =
1
n−1 . 
Proof of lemma 11: inf
W0(p)
(−λv) = −λr whenever W0(p) 6= ∅. Now consider the
problem inf
v−i∈[0,v]n−1
(pi(v−i)− λ−iv−i). Consider the minimization over some vj , j 6= i with
vs, s /∈ {i, j} fixed. Given (5), the objective is convex and piecewise-affine and λj ≥ 0, so
the optimal choice of vj is either v (if λj ≥ v−riv−rj ) or such that
vj−rj
v−rj = max{0,maxs 6=i,j
vs−rs
v−rs }
(otherwise). But this is true for every j, vj = v for some j implies that vs = v for all
s 6= i. If, on the other hand, for every j the second possibility materializes, we obtain
that
vj−rj
v−rj = η, η ∈ [0, 1] for all j 6= i. Note in the first case (vj = v for all j 6= i) this
condition is also satisfied. Thus, it is sufficient to optimize over η. Given the linearity of
the objective, the two possible corner solutions will yield either an infimum of ri− λ−ir−i
or v − v∑
j 6=i
λj from which the expression (30) follows. 
Proof of Lemma 12:
For brevity, we will write r∗ instead of r∗(λ).
Define
g(r) :=


min
{
min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λiv),−λr
}
, r > 0,
min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λiv), o/w.
(40)
We will prove that if
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≤ 1, r∗ maximizes g(r). Then it will follow that r∗ maximizes
R(r, λ).
Note that g(r) is discontinuous at any point of the set R0 := {r ∈ [0, v]n : ri =
0 for some i}. We will show directly that g(r∗) ≥ g(r) for any other point r ∈ [0, v]n. To
this end, we will construct a finite sequence of points starting with any point r ∈ (0, v]n
and ending with r∗ such that the value of g weakly increases at every step. Denote
Ei(r) := ri − λ−ir−i − λiv. We will proceed by considering two cases: (1) the starting
point r /∈ R0; (2) r ∈ R0.
Case 1. The starting point r /∈ R0. Note that if ri > r∗i for some i, g(r) is improved
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by changing ri to r
∗
i . Indeed, ri > r
∗
i is equivalent to Ei(r) > −λr, so Ei is higher than
the overall minimum in the first line in (40). Decreasing ri to r
∗
i will weakly increase −λr
and Ej(r) for all j 6= i, thus weakly increasing the value of g. If the new point r˜ is in
R0, proceed directly to Case 2 below. If after coordinates ri such that ri > r∗i were all
lowered to r∗i , we are still not in R0 proceed as follows.
Consider any r ∈ (0, v]n such that ri ≤ r∗i for all i. Note that Ei(r) ≤ −λr for all i.
Denote by E(1)(r) the lowest of Ei and by E(2)(r) the second lowest. Assume that the
numbers Ei(r) are not all identical, i.e. E(1)(r) < E(2)(r) (if they are not, skip right away
to the next paragraph). Denote by L1(r) the set {i : Ei(r) = E(1)(r)} and by L2(r) the
set {i : Ei(r) = E(2)(r)}. Now change all ri for i in L1(r) in such a way that the new
point r˜ satisfies L1(r˜) = L1(r)∪L2(r), i.e. the values of Ei for i ∈ L1(r) and i ∈ L2(r) are
equalized. The key is to show that g(r) won’t decrease after this move. First, all prices ri
for i ∈ L1(r) will increase after this move, as the inequality E(1)(r) < E(2)(r) is equivalent
to (1 + λi)ri − λiv < (1 + λj)rj − λjv for all i ∈ L1(r) and j ∈ L2(r). Second, because
Ei = Ej for all i, j ∈ L1(r), rj = (1+λi)ri+(λj−λi)v1+λj for all i, j ∈ L1(r) and thus
g(r) = E(1)(r) = ri(1 + λi)

1− ∑
j∈L1(r)
λj
1 + λj

+ const, (41)
for all i ∈ L1(r), where const does not depend on ri for i /∈ L1(r). As ri will increase
during the move and, by supposition,
∑
λi
1+λi
≤ 1, g(r) will weakly increase. Also, note
that the new prices r˜ are still weakly lower than r∗ because Ei(r) ≤ −λr still holds for
all i after the move.
Now iterate this procedure until all Ei(r) are equalized. At each step, the value of g(r)
will weakly increase, and the eventual price r˜ satisfies r˜ ≤ r∗. At the last step, increase r˜
to r∗. g(r) will grow again due to the representation (41). This finishes Case 1.
Case 2. The starting point r ∈ R0. We will extend g(r) to the set Rext := {r ∈
(−∞, v]n : ri = 0 for some i} by the same formula as on R0 and show that for every
r ∈ R0 there is a point r∗∗ ∈ Rext such that g(r∗∗) ≥ g(r). After that we show that
g(r∗) ≥ g(r∗∗) for all such r∗∗.
Given a point r ∈ R0, take any k such that rk = 0. If Ei(r) > Ek(r) one can lower
ri down to the point at which Ei(r) = Ek(r), without harming g (note that it is possible
because Rext is unbounded from below.) If, one the other hand, Ei(r) ≤ Ek(r) for all i,
the same construction as in Case 1 shows that one can weakly increase prices in a certain
fashion such that g is again unharmed. The final point of this process will be a point
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r∗∗(k) ∈ Rext such that Ei(r∗∗) = Ek(r∗∗) for all i and g(r∗∗(k)) ≥ g(r).
r∗∗(k) is given by r∗∗i (k) =
λi−λk
1+λi
v for i. It remains to prove that g(r∗∗(k)) ≤ g(r∗) for
all k. The inequality g(r∗∗(k)) ≤ g(r∗) reads as
−
∑
j 6=k
λj
λj − λk
1 + λj
v − λkv ≤ −
n∑
i=1
λ2i
1 + λi
v,
which is equivalent to
λk
(
n∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
− 1
)
≤ 0,
which is certainly true due to the supposition of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 13: We will prove that for all λ such that
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≥ 1,
max
r
R(r, λ) = mλ + v (1−∑i λi). Then the result will follow because when the in-
equality is strict, one can lower some λj to make it equality, and the value of revenue will
strictly increase. If lowering one λj is not enough (i.e.,
∑
i
λi
1+λi
> 1 even when λj = 0),
one can start lowering another λj , etc. One will always reach the equality
∑
i
λi
1+λi
= 1
because its LHS is zero when all λi are equal to zero.
Indeed, by (30), we have that R(r, λ) ≤ mλ + v (1−∑i λi) for all r. On the other
hand,
R(r∗(λ), λ) = mλ+min
{
v
(
1−
n∑
i=1
λi
)
,−
n∑
i=1
λ2i
1 + λi
v
}
.
If
∑
i
λi
1+λi
≥ 1, the first argument of the minimum is weakly lower, so R(r∗(λ), λ) =
mλ + v (1−∑i λi). Hence, the upper bound is achieved, and thus maxr R(r, λ) = mλ +
v (1−∑i λi). 
Proof of Lemma 14: First, solve the relaxed problem without the constrain (32).
The solution is λ∗i =
√
v
v−mi − 1. This solution is the solution to the unrelaxed problem
whenever is satisfies the constraint (32), which is exactly when
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v ≥ n− 1.
When
n∑
i=1
√
1−mi/v < n− 1. Denoting by ξ the Lagrange multiplier on (32) and by
κi on nonnegativity constraints, one can easily show that the multipliers
ξ∗ = v − 1
(n− k∗)2
(
n∑
i=k∗
√
v −mi
)2
,
κ∗i = max{ξ∗ −mi, 0},
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together with the proposed solution (34), satisfy first-order and complementary slackness
conditions. As there is no other solution to first-order and complementary slackness con-
ditions, the objective function is continuous, and the feasible set is compact, we conclude
that λ∗ is the solution to the problem (31)-(32), as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider the case of low means first. In this case, all λ∗i
are strictly positive and
∑
i
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
< 1. Hence, at all steps in the proof of Lemma 12, the
value of g(r) increases strictly. Furthermore, g(r∗(λ∗)) = −∑i λ∗2i1+λ∗i v < v (1−∑i λ∗i ).
Hence, R(r, λ∗) = g(r) at all steps in the proof of Lemma 12. Thus, r∗(λ∗) is the unique
maximizer of R(r, λ∗). Plugging λ∗ given by (33) to r∗i =
λ∗i v
1+λ∗
, one gets the desired answer
(35).
Now suppose means are high. First, note that if λ∗i = 0, then lowering ri to r
∗
i = 0
won’t change the value of g(r), hence, any price ri ∈ [0, v] is optimal. Without loss of
generality, now suppose that all bidders are strictly included. At all other steps in the
proof of Lemma 12 g(r) will increase strictly except the last step where all Ei(r) are
already equalized and one is ready to equalize them with −λr. Indeed, as L1(r) now
includes all bidders, and
∑
i
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
= 1, the expression in parentheses in (41) is zero. Thus,
a vector of prices r is optimal if and only if Ei(r) = Ej(r) = g(r
∗(λ∗)) = v (1−∑i λ∗i )
for all i, j and ri ≤ r∗i (λ∗i ) for all i. Thus, r should satisfy a non-homogeneous system
of linear equations given by A(λ∗)r = b where bi = v
(
1−∑
j 6=i
λ∗j
)
. As
∑
i
λ∗i
1+λ∗i
= 1, by
Lemma 7, part 1, A(λ∗) is singular and its rank is n− 1. Because r∗(λ∗) is a solution to
the non-homogeneous system and vın − r∗(λ∗) is a solution to the homogeneous system,
the set of solutions is given by {r∗(λ∗) − α(vın − r∗(λ∗))|α ∈ R}. Thus, every vector of
optimal prices r satisfies vın − rˆ = (1 + α)(vın − r∗(λ∗), thus
v − ri
v − rˆj =
v − r∗i
v − r∗j
=
1 + λ∗j
1 + λ∗i
=
√
v −mi
v −mj ,
where we used the expressions for λ∗i from (34). Finally, summing the inequalities ri ≤
r∗i (λ
∗), one gets
n∑
i=1
ri ≤
n∑
i=1
λ∗i
1 + λ∗i
v = v.

Proof of Proposition 7: First, take any mechanism M = (p1(v2), p2(v1)) that satis-
fies the conditions in the proposition. It is straightforward to check, using the representa-
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tion (8), that R(M,λ∗(LSAopt)) = R∗ where λ∗(LSAopt) are the optimal Lagrange mul-
tipliers for the optimal linear score auction, given by (33). As R∗ = R(M,λ∗(LSAopt)) ≤
R(M,λ∗(M)) ≤ R∗, it must be that R(M,λ∗(M)) = R∗, so M is optimal.
Now, take any optimal mechanism M . By lemma 15, λ∗i (M) > 0. Hence, when M is
submitted as a starting mechanism to the proof of theorem 1, one gets in Grand case
I. Denote by p˜(M) the modified threshold functions for M as constructed in the proof of
theorem 1, given by (13). We will reconstruct p˜(M) from optimality of M . First, note,
that the LSA that weakly dominates M should in fact be the optimal LSA. Because any
dominating LSA is such that its vector of reserve prices r is a fixed point of p˜, it must
by that r∗, as defined by (35) should be a fixed point of p˜(M). On the other hand, by
lemma 15, p˜i must have slope of λ
∗
i given by (33). Thus, p˜i should be given by the RHS in
condition 1 in the proposition. As p˜i ≤ pi, condition 1 in the proposition must be fulfilled.
To establish condition 2, note that because M is optimal, revenue may not strictly in-
crease at every step in the proof of theorem 1, and thus, inf
W0(p)
(−λ∗(M)v) = inf
W0(pˆ)
(−λ∗(M)v)
where p are the threshold functions corresponding to M and pˆ are the threshold func-
tions for the optimal linear score auction. Thus, the set W0(p) must lie weakly be-
low the line λ∗1v1 + λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2. However, if condition 2 is violated, this is
not true. Indeed, suppose p1(v
0
2) > (λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2 − λ∗2v02) /λ∗1 for some v02 ≤ r∗2. Take
any v01 ∈ ((λ∗1r∗1 + λ∗2r∗2 − λ∗2v02) /λ∗1), p1(v02). Then, p1(v02) > v01 by construction and
p2(v
0
1) > v
0
2 because condition 1 is satisfied for the function p2(v1). Hence, (v
0
1, v
0
2) is
a point in W0(p) that lies above λ
∗
1v1 + λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2. Contradiction.
To establish condition 3, suppose to the contrary that there exist points v′1 and v
′′
1
such that r∗1 ≤ v′1 < v′′1 and p2(v′′2) < p2(v′1). Consider any v02 ∈ (p2(v′′1), p2(v′1)). First,
note that for any such v02 we must have p1(v
0
2) ≥ v′′1 . If not, then the point (v′′1 , v02) proves
that the functions p violate the supply constraint. Second, for any such v02 we must have
p1(v
0
2) ≤ v′1. If not, the point (v′1, v02) belongs to the set W0(p) and lies above the line
λ∗1v1 + λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2, which is impossible by condition 2. Summing up, we have
p1(v
0
2) ≤ v′1 < v′′1 ≤ p1(v02) – a contradiction. Thus, p2(v1) has to be weakly increasing.
Analogously for p1(v2).
Finally, take any interval (v′1, v
′′
1), v
′
1 ≥ r∗1 such that p2(v1) is strictly increasing on
it and any point v01 ∈ (v′1, v′′1). Suppose to the contrary that p1(p2(v01)) 6= v01. Either
p1(p2(v
0
1)) > v
0
1 or p1(p2(v
0
1)) < v
0
1. If p1(p2(v
0
1)) > v
0
1 , take any point v
1
1 ∈ (v01 , p1(p2(v01))).
Then, as p2(v1) is weakly increasing overall and strictly increasing on (v
′
1, v
′′
1), it must be
that p2(v
1
1) > p2(v
0
1). But then the point (v
1
1, p2(v
0
1)) belongs to the set W0(p) and lies
above the line λ∗1v1 + λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2, which is impossible by condition 2. If, on the
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other hand, p1(p2(v
0
1)) < v
0
1, take any point v
1
1 ∈ (p1(p2(v01)), v01). Again, it must be that
p2(v
1
1) < p2(v
0
1). But then the point (v
1
1, p2(v
0
1)) proves that the functions p violate the
supply constraint. Contradiction. Analogously for p1(v2). 
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof of sufficiency is the same as in the proof of
proposition 7. The proof of necessity is as follows.
Take any optimal mechanism M . By lemma 15, λ∗i (M) is given by (34). By the same
logic as in the proof of proposition 7, some rˆ that satisfies the conditions (36) is a fixed
point of p˜(M). If rˆ > 0, this, along with λ∗i , pins down p˜(M) to be the functions given
in the condition 1 in the proposition (regardless of rˆ). If rˆi = 0 for some i, we have
0 = max{λ∗−irˆ−i + bi, 0}. If λ∗−irˆ−i + bi < 0, then inf
v−i
(pi(v−i)− λ∗−iv−i) = bi < −λ∗−irˆ−i =
inf
v−i
(pˆi(v−i)− λ∗−iv−i) so M is not optimal. Thus, we must have λ∗−irˆ−i + bi = 0, so p˜(M)
are reconstructed unambiguously to be functions defined in the RHS of conditions 1 and
2 in the proposition. Thus, condition 2 holds.
To establish condition 3, note that for any optimal LSA pˆ, revenue is equal to λ∗m+
inf
W0(pˆ∗)
(−λ∗v) where pˆ∗ is the optimal LSA with the highest prices r∗. Thus, for M to be
optimal it must be that inf
W0(p)
(−λ∗v) ≥ inf
W0(pˆ∗)
(−λ∗v). Thus, the set W0(p) must lie weakly
below the line λ∗1v1+λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1+λ
∗
2r
∗
2. Then, one obtains condition 3 similarly to proof
of necessity of condition 2 in proposition 7.
Finally, to establish condition 1, note that if pi(v−i) > r∗i + λ
∗
i (v−i − r∗−i) for some
v0−i ≥ r∗−i, then the point (v0−i, v0i ) where v0i is any point in (r∗i + λ∗i (v−i − r∗−i), pi(v−i))
belongs to W0(p) lies above the line λ
∗
1v1 + λ
∗
2v2 = λ
∗
1r
∗
1 + λ
∗
2r
∗
2, which is impossible by
condition 3. 
Proof of proposition 9: As noted in the main text, the support of any worst-case
distribution must be contained in the set of minimizers of tLSA(v)−λ∗(LSA)v. It remains
to find the optimal Lagrange multiplier λ∗ as a function of the generalized reserve prices
r. λ∗ maximizes
R(r, λ) = mλ+min{v(1− λ1 − λ2), r1 − r2λ2 − vλ1, r2 − r1λ1 − vλ2,−rλ}.
It follows from a straightforward, but tedious analysis that
• If r2 < r2(r1) and r2 < v − r1, λ∗1 = v−r2v−r1 , λ∗2 = v−r1v−r2 ;
• If r2 > r2(r1) but r2 < v − r1, λ∗i = riv−ri , i = 1, 2;
• If r2 > v − r1, either λ∗1 = r1v−r1 and λ∗2 = v−r1v−r2 or λ∗1 = v−r2v−r1 and λ∗2 = r2v−r2 .
55
From this, the statement of the proposition follows. 
Proof of theorem 2: The proof is the same as for theorem 1 with a few modifica-
tions. Lemma 4 does not hold, as the inequality (10) does not necessarily hold for i = 2,
j = 1. Define W˜2 := {v : v2 ≥ p2(v1) and v1 ≤ p1(v2)}. We have inf
v∈W2
(p2(v1) − λv) =
inf
v∈W˜2
(p2(v1)− λv). For bidder 1, we still have inf
v∈W1
(p1(v2)− λv) = inf
v∈W≥
1
(p)
(p1(v2)− λv).
The consideration of Grand case II goes identically to theorem 1, so consider Grand
case I. We have inf
v∈W˜2
(p2(v1)−λ∗v) = inf
v1∈[0,v˜1]
(p2(v1)−λ∗1v1)−λ∗2v2, where v˜1 := p1(v2). For
bidder 1, nothing changes. Thus, at the first step of transforming a given pair functions
(p1(v2), p2(v1)) we transform p1(v2), as before, to p˜1(v2), given by (13), and transform
p2(v1) to
p˜2(v1) :=


max{λ∗1v1 + inf
w∈[0,v˜1]
(p2(w)− λ∗1w), 0}, v1 ≤ v˜1;
v2, v1 > v˜1.
(42)
By the same logic as in the proof of proposition 2, R(p˜, λ∗) ≥ R(p, λ∗).
Note that for all v2 ∈ [0, v2], p˜1(v2) ≤ p˜1(v2) ≤ p1(v2) = v˜1, as p˜1 is nondecreasing
and p˜1(v2) ≤ p˜1(v2) for all v2. Thus, one may consider p˜ as a continuous map from
[0, v˜1]× [0, v2] to itself. Thus, a fixed point exists. The rest of the proof goes analogously
to the proof of theorem 1, except the consideration of Subcase 2 of Case 3. There, one
shows directly that
λ∗
1
1+λ∗
1
+
λ∗
2
1+λ∗
2
> 1 implies that either b1 < 0 or b2 = 0. Then, the point
defined by w∗ = (max{b1, 0},max{b2, 0}) will be a desired fixed point with at least one
zero coordinate.
Note that the construction will identify a dominating linear score auction such that
the boundary between W1 and W2 goes through the point (v˜1, v2).

Proof of proposition 10: Again, because for any optimal mechanism λ∗ ≥ 0, one
can restrict attention only for such λ. Solving the inner problems as in the proof of 11,
one obtains that R(p, λ) is equal to


λm+min
{
v˜1 − λ2v2 − λ1v1, v2 − λ1v˜1 − λ2v2,min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λivi),−λr
}
, r > 0,
λm+min
{
v˜1 − λ2v2 − λ1v1, v2 − λ1v˜1 − λ2v2,min
i
(ri − λ−ir−i − λivi)
}
, o/w.
(43)
The problem is to maximize this function over r ∈ [0, v1] × [0, v2], λ ∈ R2+, and
v˜1 ∈ [0, v1]. Again, it is more convenient to optimize first over r and v˜, and then over λ.
Optimizing over v˜1, one does weakly better equalizing v˜1−λ2v2−λ1v1 and v2−λ1v˜1−λ2v2,
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thus setting v˜∗1 =
λ1v1+v2
λ1+1
. The common value of the two expressions will be
λ1v1 + v2
λ1 + 1
− λ2v2 − λ1v1. (44)
Then, defining r∗i (λ) =
λi
1+λi
vi, the proofs of lemmas 12 and 13 go through with (44)
replacing v (1−∑i λi). (Also, one lowers the value of λ2, not any λ to obtain a strict
improvement.
Thus, we arrive at a problem similar to (31)-(32):
max
λ≥0
2∑
i=1
miλi − λ
2
i
1 + λi
vi (45)
s.t.
2∑
i=1
λi
1 + λi
≤ 1 (46)
Its solution again differs depending on whether the constraint (46) binds. It does not
bind when means are low (
√
1−m1/v1 +
√
1−m2/v2 > 1) and binds otherwise. If it
does not bind, we obtain
λ∗i =
√
vi
vi −mi − 1,
and thus, recovering optimal prices using same logic as in the proof of proposition 6,
one gets (37). To recover all optimal slopes in this case (aside from an optimal slope
corresponding to v˜∗1 =
λ1v1+v2
λ1+1
.), one uses proposition 7 (its logic is unchanged when upper
bounds are different). Restricting condition 1 of proposition 7 to linear score auctions,
one gets the condition (38).
If the constraint (46) binds, one obtains from first-order conditions that the equation
(39) must hold for the optimal λ∗1. But note that when the constraint binds, λ ∗1 λ∗2 = 1,
and thus, the optimal slope γ∗ is unique (as in Figure 9). Hence, γ∗ = λ∗1, so γ
∗ satisfies
(39).To obtain the set of optimal prices, one again uses the same proof as in proposition
6. 
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Appendix B: Revelation Principle under unknown value
distribution
9.1 Dominant strategy implementation: a positive result
If the seller restricts attention to dominant-strategy incentive-compatible and ex post
individually rational mechanisms, then it is almost obvious that Revelation principle goes
through because the set of equilibria in dominant strategies almost does not depend on the
distribution F . A slight wrinkle is that the definition of dominant strategy depends on the
support of F : only types of bidder i from a projection of supp(F ) on [0, v] are required
to have a dominant action. But this can be overcome noting that because supp(F ) is
not known a priori, it might as well be full [0, v]n and thus all types of every bidder are
possible.
Formally, suppose the seller uses an indirect mechanism that consists of a collection of
action sets Ai for all i and of the outcome functions xi(a), ti(a). Denote by Vi(F ) the set
of types of bidder i that appear in the support of F . This mechanism has a dominant-
strategy equilibrium given F if for all i and vi ∈ Vi(F ) there exists an action a∗i (vi) such
that
vixi(a
∗
i (vi), a−i)− ti(a∗i (vi), a−i) ≥ vixi(a′i, a−i)− ti(a′i, a−i)
for all a−i ∈ A−i and all alternative actions a′i ∈ Ai. This mechanism is then ex post
individually rational if for all vi ∈ Vi(F ),
vixi(a
∗
i (vi), a−i)− ti(a∗i (vi), a−i) ≥ 0
for all a−i. (If there are several dominant actions for vi, the choice of a particular one
does not matter since all such actions yield the same utility for the type vi, for every a−i.)
Because the seller does not know F , she considers only mechanisms that have a
dominant-strategy equilibrium and are ex post individually rational (for short, ex post
mechanisms) for all F ∈ ∆. But this obviously is equivalent to requiring that the mech-
anism is ex post for all F ∈ ∆ with full support on [0, v]n. Thus, the standard definition
of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality follows.
Now, if there are several dominant actions for some types, and thus, several dominant
strategies, the seller can, as usual, suggest the bidders the profile of dominant strategies
that yields the highest worst-case expected revenue (with mechanism fixed).
Calling this profile of strategies a∗∗i (vi), one can pass on to the direct truthful mech-
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anism in the usual way: take Vi = [0, v], x˜i(v) := xi(a
∗∗
1 (v1), . . . , a
∗∗
n (vn)), t˜i(v) =
ti(a
∗∗
1 (v1), . . . , a
∗∗
n (vn)). This mechanism has a dominant-strategy equilibrium in which
bidders truthfully report their types and it is ex post individually rational. Moreover, it
induces the same value of transfers as the original mechanism for every profile of types,
and thus, the same worst-case revenue. (And the same worst-case distribution F ∗ if it
exists.)
9.2 Difficulties with Bayes-Nash equilibrium implementation
Suppose one uses Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) implementation. If type distribution F
is unknown, and the performance of a mechanism is evaluated by the worst-case scenario,
it becomes not obvious that one can restrict attention to direct mechanisms in which
truthful reporting is an equilibrium. The main reason is not that there may be multiple
equilibria and one may not be able to suggest a particular one if F is unknown (partial
vs. full implementation) although this can certainly be an issue. The main reason is that
F impacts the expected revenue not only directly but through equilibrium strategies as
well and so the worst-case distribution may change after passing from the original indirect
mechanism to the direct one.
Formally, denote the seller’s expected revenue as a function of (potentially indirect)
mechanism, value distribution and equilibrium as R(M,F, e). Denote by E(M,F ) the set
of Bayes-Nash equilibria of mechanism M under F . Denote by ∆ the set of distributions
the seller deems possible. Denote by M0 the set of mechanisms M such that E(M,F ) is
not empty for all F ∈ ∆. The robust mechanism design problem may be stated as
max
M∈M0
min
F∈∆
min
e∈E(M,F )
R(M,F, e).
Suppose for simplicity that E(M,F ) is a singleton for all M ∈M0 and all F ∈ ∆. Then,
the problem may be restated as
max
M∈M0
min
F∈∆
R(M,F, e(M,F )). (47)
Take any mechanism M ∈ M0. A straightforward construction of a direct truthful
mechanism that (hopefully) does as good as M would be as follows. Compute the worst-
case F ∗ given M , i.e., the one that delivers minimum in (47). Take the equilibirum
e(F ∗,M) and use the equilibrium strategies to form a direct mechanism in a usual way,
i.e. x˜(v) := x(a∗1(v1), . . . , a
∗
n(vn)) and the same for transfers where a
∗
i (vi) are equilibrium
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strategies in e(F ∗,M). Call this mechanism Mdirect. Indeed, if Nature still chooses F ∗ as
a worst-case distribution under Mdirect, truthful reporting is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
inMdirect and the worst-case expected revenue is the same. But it is far from obvious that
F ∗ is still worst-case, because F impacts revenue both directly and through equilibrium
e(F,M) (i.e., Nature may change not only relative frequencies of types but the outcome
sum-of-transfers function t(v) itself, by changing equilibrium strategies). This second
effect was absent in the dominant strategy implementation case, so F ∗ was still worst-
case there.
Appendix C: Mechanisms with negative λi
Example 1. Suppose there are two bidders with vi ∈ [0, 1]. The second bidder never
gets the object, but the first bidder gets one iff
v1 > p1(v2) = 1−
√
1−m1 + kv2
for some small k > 0.
Because the optimal price for the first bidder in the absence of the second bidder is
1−√1−m1, Nature wants the payment p1(v2) to be as far from it as possible and thus
it prefers high second bidder’s values. Thus, if m2 grows, the worst-case revenue will
decrease, i.e. λ∗2 < 0.
Example 2. Suppose there are two bidders with different upper bounds and means
such that v1 > m1 > v2.
Consider a corner-hitting LSA with r1 ∈ (v2, m1), r2 < v2. Suppose also that the
parameters satisfy
m2 < v2 − v2
v1 − r1 (v1 −m1).
It this case, the worst-case distributions is a three-point distribution on (r1, 0), (v1, 0)
and (v1, v2) (if the tie breaking is such that the second bidder gets the object if v =
(v1, v2), otherwise this point can be approximated). But then, the higher m2 is, the
higher probability Nature can put on the point (v1, v2), which harms the seller because
her revenue is v2 if v = (v1, v2) and it is r1 > v2 if v = (v1, 0). Indeed, the expected
revenue is equal to (
1− r1
v2
)
m2 +
m1 − r1
v1 − r1 r1,
so λ∗2 = 1− r1v2 < 0.
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